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JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE, 
LAW AND MORALITY 
MITCHELL N. BERMANt 
ABSTRACT 
Anglo-American theorists of the criminal law have concentrated 
on-one is tempted to say "obsessed over"-the distinction between 
justification and excuse for a good quarter-century and the scholarly 
attention has purchased unusually widespread agreement. 
Justification defenses are said to apply when the actor's conduct was 
not morally wrongful; excuse defenses lie when the actor did engage 
in wrongful conduct but is not morally blameworthy. A near- 
consensus thus achieved, theorists have turned to subordinate matters, 
joining issue most notably on the question of whether justifications 
are "subjective"-turning upon the actor's reasons for acting-or 
"objective"-involving only facts independent of the actor's beliefs 
and motives. 
This Article seeks to demonstrate that the prevailing understanding 
is wrong. Drawing on the well-known distinction between conduct 
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rules and decision rules, it argues that the distinction between 
justification and excuse, for purposes of a criminal law taxonomy, is 
only this: A justified action is not criminal, whereas an excused 
defendant has committed a criminal act but is not punishable. To 
readers only marginally acquainted with the relevant literature, this 
claim may seem far from extravagant, for occasional statements to the 
same effect can be found in the case law and commentary. In fact, 
however, theorists have not appreciated just how this articulation of 
the distinction differs from the orthodox one, nor what consequences 
follow. This Article attempts to remedy that defect. 
One lesson of a systematic investigation into these competing 
formulations is that the long-running debate over whether 
justifications, properly understood, are "subjective" or "objective" is 
misconceived. This is a debate over policy broadly conceived, not (as 
it so often purports to be) a matter of conceptual analysis. More 
generally, this Article's examination of justification and excuse 
constitutes a case study in the complex relationship between legal and 
moral reasoning, and highlights the importance of distinguishing 
arguments that advance substantive value judgments from those that 
purport to analyze our conceptual apparatus. It may be that 
conceptual analysis is no less contestable or value-laden than is 
substantive normative argument (though perhaps it is). In any event, 
they are not the very same enterprise and a first step to clear 
thinking-in the criminal law and elsewhere-is to keep them distinct. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scholarship, like all human artifacts, has its fashions. In the field 
of Anglo-American criminal law theory perhaps no subject has been 
more in vogue the past twenty-odd years than the distinction between 
justification and excuse. Most responsible for this upsurge in scholarly 
interest are Professors George Fletcher and Paul Robinson, who 
debated the subject in 1975,' and who have written repeatedly on the 
topic ever since. But Fletcher and Robinson are now in crowded 
company. Indeed, the full list of contributors to the topic reads like a 
Who's Who of contemporary criminal law theorists on both sides of 
the Atlantic.2 
This outpouring of scholarly attention has appeared to pay 
dividends, as the distinction between justification and excuse has 
become one of the rare subjects on which scholars have reached wide 
agreement, essentially echoing Fletcher's view that "[a] justification 
negates an assertion of wrongful conduct. An excuse negates a charge 
that the particular defendant is personally to blame for the wrongful 
1. Compare Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite 
for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266 (1975) (defending a purely objective theory of 
justification), with George Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. 
Robinson, 23 UCLA L. REV. 293 (1975) (arguing that full justifications must be both subjective 
and objective). Fletcher in particular is widely credited for having put the justification/excuse 
distinction on the contemporary scholarly agenda. See Joshua Dressier, Justifications and 
Excuses: A Brief Overview of the Concepts in the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1159 & 
n.13 (1987) (citing authorities). 
2. The list of Anglo-American scholars who have written on the subject includes (though 
is hardly limited to) Larry Alexander, Joshua Dressier, John Gardner, Kent Greenawalt, 
Jeremy Horder, Heidi Hurd, Douglas Husak, Sanford Kadish, Michael Moore, J.C. Smith, and 
Jeremy Waldron. Relevant works are cited infra passim. This Article does not explore 
continental approaches to the justification/excuse distinction. 
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conduct."3 In fact, at a recent meeting of the Criminal Law Section of 
the American Association of Law Schools, Joshua Dressler cited 
theorists' resolution of the justification/excuse problem as the leading 
illustration of the successes that criminal law theory has achieved over 
the past couple of decades.4 The solidity of this consensus has freed 
theorists to focus on subordinate questions, joining issue most notably 
on the question of whether justifications are "subjective"-turning 
upon the actor's reasons for acting-or "objective"-involving only 
facts independent of the actor's beliefs and motives.5 
I believe that the prevailing consensus is wrong. Instead, I argue, 
the distinction between justification and excuse for purposes of 
taxonomizing criminal law defenses is only this: A justified action is 
not criminal, whereas an excused defendant has committed a crime 
but is not punishable. To readers only marginally acquainted with the 
relevant literature, this claim might seem far from extravagant, for 
occasional statements to the same effect can be found in the case law 
and commentary.6 Despite such statements, however, this view has 
wanted for systematic development. Indeed, theorists have seemingly 
not appreciated just how this formulation of the distinction differs 
from the orthodox one, nor what consequences follow. 
This Article attempts to remedy that defect. It proceeds as 
follows. Part I first presents the prevailing conceptualization of the 
justification/excuse distinction in contemporary criminal law 
scholarship-what I term the "substantive equivalence thesis." It then 
criticizes this view by showing that persons who engage in morally 
justified conduct may not be justified in law, and that criminal 
defenses most plausibly denominated as justifications extend to 
morally unjustified conduct. 
3. George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 958 (1985); 
see also, e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 759 (1978) ("Claims of 
justification concede that the definition of the offense is satisfied, but challenge whether the act 
is wrongful; claims of excuse concede that the act is wrongful, but seek to avoid the attribution 
of the act to the actor."). 
4. Joshua Dressier, What is the Point of Teaching and Scholarship in Criminal Law and 
Procedure?, Presentation at the American Association of Law Schools Conference on Criminal 
Justice, Washington, D.C. (June 11, 2000); cf Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, 
and Duress: Making Sense, Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 
218 n.19 (2002) (describing the justification/excuse distinction as constituting "a vital strain of 
the scholarly literature"). 
5. For a sound overview of the subjective/objective debate, see Russell L. Christopher, 
Mistake of Fact in the Objective Theory ofJustification: Do Two Rights Make Two Wrongs Make 
Two Rights... ?, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 295-303 (1994). 
6. See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
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Part II introduces and defends a competing account-the 
"structural equivalence thesis"-pursuant to which justifications and 
excuses play the same role in the structural logic of moral and legal 
reasoning, even though their substantive content may differ. 
Specifically, a justification serves to qualify a norm of behavior by 
providing that one who is justified does not violate the governing 
norm; an excuse serves to release one who has violated a norm from 
some or all of the consequences that ordinarily attach to the norm 
violation. One question this conceptualization raises is how to 
determine whether any given defense is more properly categorized as 
conferring permission (thus serving as a "justification") or as making 
an offender unpunishable (thus serving as an "excuse"). This Part 
argues that the language of the governing statute is not conclusive 
and that the answer is instead a sociological fact (potentially difficult 
to discover and inherently contestable) about that particular criminal 
law regime. 
The question of whether there exist any intrinsic or natural 
substantive constraints on the classification of defenses as 
justifications or excuses is further pursued in Part III, which takes up 
the long-running debate over whether justifications must be 
"subjective" or "objective." I argue that this is principally a debate 
over policy broadly conceived, not-as it so often purports to be-a 
matter of conceptual analysis. In developing this argument, this Part 
pays particular, and critical, attention to the most important and 
theoretically ambitious proposal for comprehensive criminal law 
reform of recent years-Paul Robinson's draft codes.7 
Part IV explores two further implications of the structural 
equivalence thesis. It shows, contrary to prevailing wisdom, that 
proper conceptualization of the justification/excuse distinction by 
itself generates no particular consequences for the permissibility of 
assistance or interference by third parties. It also argues that trying to 
classify existing defenses-like self-defense and protection of 
property-is a perilous enterprise insofar as these putative defenses 
are really defense clusters, not discrete defenses. With this caveat in 
mind, the final Part nonetheless offers some thoughts about the 
proper classification of duress and provocation. 
All of this is in service of a broader ambition. That ambition is 
not, however, to demonstrate just how important the 
7. See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN THE CRIMINAL 
LAW (1997). 
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justification/excuse distinction is for purposes of marking legal, as 
distinct from moral, categories. To be sure, so long as scholars are 
going to employ it, it's important that they get the distinction right. 
But whether they should employ it at all is a separate question, one 
about which I'm frankly skeptical. Rather, by highlighting the 
difference between conceptual and normative reasoning in this one 
heavily mined context, I hope to focus scholars' attention on the 
importance of distinguishing their substantive, normative arguments 
from their conceptual or logical ones. This lesson-which does not 
presuppose that arguments of the latter sort are purely "factual," and 
thus does not depend upon a strong version of the fact/value 
distinction-can pay dividends not just for theorists of the criminal 
law, but across domains of legal scholarship. 
I. MORAL THEORY AND THE SUBSTANTIVE EQUIVALENCE THESIS 
Contemporary criminal law scholarship commonly sorts defenses 
into three broad classes: justifications, excuses, and a third category 
variously termed defenses of law enforcement policy, or 
"nonexculpatory defenses," or the like.8 Although core instances of 
each category are readily identified without the need for an explicitly 
agreed-upon definition-necessity is a justification, insanity is an 
excuse, the statute of limitations is a policy defense-scholars have 
struggled to fine-tune these distinctions.9 In particular, a vast 
8. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. 
L. REV. 199, 229-32 (1982) (terming the third category of defenses "nonexculpatory defenses"); 
cf SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL AW 82 (1987) 
(categorizing defenses as based on law enforcement policy or culpability, with culpability 
defenses including the two subcategories of justification and excuse); MICHAEL S. MOORE, 
PLACING BLAME 482 (1997) (dividing defenses, first, "between extrinsic policy defences and 
culpability defences," and then subdividing the latter into justifications and excuses). 
9. Any general comments about common doctrinal defenses like "necessity" risk 
miscommunication because the term is familiar to all criminal lawyers but differs in precise 
content across jurisdictions. When speaking of necessity, I will be referring to the "lesser evils" 
defense, no matter the source of the danger. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE ? 3.02(1)(a) (1962) 
("Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to 
another is justifiable, provided that ... the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is 
greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged."). I use 
"duress" in a generic sense to refer to situations in which the defendant acted in the face of 
substantial pressures but did not choose the lesser evil. The precise extent and manner in which 
this sense of duress is realized in actual doctrine-such as whether it extends to "duress of 
circumstances" as well as to do-it-or-else commands issued by another person, and whether it is 
available in homicide cases-are matters of positive law with regard to which my references to 
"duress" simpliciter are intended to remain flexible. 
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literature has developed concerning justification and excuse, 
exploring such questions as the practical implications of the 
distinction, and which doctrinal defenses belong in which category. 
However, the chief concern of contributors-and the logically prior 
one-has been to identify the conceptual difference between these 
two categories of defense. 
A. The Standard Account 
A first cut at the difference between justification and excuse 
starts by recognizing that, unlike the third category of nonexculpatory 
policy defenses, "justification" and "excuse" are not uniquely legal 
terms. According to the standard account in ethics, justified action is 
not wrongful whereas excused action is wrongful conduct for which 
the actor is not "morally responsible,"'0 in the particular sense of not 
being blameworthy." It is not surprising therefore that the standard 
10. "Responsible" is a notoriously ambiguous term in normative discourse. (For the classic 
taxonomy, see generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 211-30 (1968). An 
important recent examination, in part critical of Hart's account, is PETER CANE, 
RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY (2002).) Thus, I cannot exclude the possibility that I 
have misinterpreted some authors' unqualified or unelaborated references to "responsibility" or 
"moral responsibility." Nonetheless, I am reasonably confident that the statement in text fairly 
represents what authors mean by "responsible" in this context. 
11. The locus classicus of this distinction (albeit of modern vintage) is J.L. Austin, A Plea 
for Excuses, in 57 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 1 (1956-57). See, e.g., id. at 2 
("In the one defence, briefly, we accept responsibility but deny that it was bad: in the other, we 
admit that it was bad but don't accept full, or even any, responsibility."). For a recent 
exploration of some of the philosophical issues concerning justification and excuse, see 
SUZANNE UNIACKE, PERMISSIBLE KILLING: THE SELF-DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION OF HOMICIDE 
9-30 (1994). 
On the view described in the text, to reiterate, no conduct is all-things-considered 
wrongful, yet justified because the presence of a justification renders presumptively or 
seemingly wrongful conduct not wrongful. See John Gardner, In Defence of Defences, in 
FLORES JURIS ET LEGUM: FESTSKRIFT ILL NILS JAREBORG 1 (Uppsala: Iustus Forlag 2002), 
available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/-lawf0081/defences.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2003) (on file with 
the Duke Law Journal) ("According to the 'closure' view, no action is wrong unless it is wrong 
all things considered, i.e. taking account of both the reasons in favour of performing it (the pros) 
and the reasons against performing it (the cons)."). On a minority view powerfully developed by 
Martha Nussbaum and recently endorsed by John Gardner, a justification qualifies wrongdoing 
but does not extinguish it: wrongful but justified conduct remains wrongful (albeit far preferable 
to wrongful and unjustified conduct). See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF 
GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 25-50 (1986); Gardner, 
supra, at 3. Because the former view-what Gardner dubs "the closure view"--is so 
predominant, and because to attempt an even minimally adequate defense of it would 
significantly expand an already long Article, I will assume it here without giving the competing 
position the attention it doubtlessly deserves. 
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account among criminal law theorists follows identical lines: A 
defense is a justification if it renders the actor's conduct not morally 
wrongful, whereas it is an excuse if it renders morally wrongful 
conduct not blameworthy.12 (See Figure 1.) This view is captured also, 
Two quick points, though. First, although Gardner is surely right that some duties-most 
especially the duty to show regret-arise from justified actions, id. at 7-8, this is not, I think, 
because the justified action remains wrongful. Rather, it's because the justified action has 
produced some unfortunate state of affairs (such as injury to another person) about which it is a 
mark of decency, and perhaps a duty of empathy, to feel regret. Tellingly, this duty to express 
regret arises even from conduct that (on most accounts) is not wrongful at all-such as 
nonnegligently causing injury to a negligent victim. Precisely for this reason, I think, Nussbaum 
takes pains to argue that justified wrongdoing is "occasion not only for regret but for an 
emotion more like remorse." NUSSBAUM, supra, at 27. Presumably, that is, a duty to feel and 
show remorse tracks wrongdoing: it does not exist absent wrongdoing and it cannot be mooted 
by justification. See id. at 43 (stating that the expression of remorse, unlike mere regret, is an 
admission of a defective action). I am just not persuaded that Nussbaum proves out either 
component of this two-part claim. What Nussbaum's subtle analysis does show, it seems to me, 
is that one's failure to experience appropriate emotions and attitudes when faced with a moral 
conflict can make one blameworthy. See, e.g., id. at 33 (describing, as "the central theme in the 
Chorus's blame of Agamemnon," that "he adopted an inappropriate attitude towards his 
conflict, killing a human child with no more agony, no more revulsion of feeling, than if she had 
indeed been an animal of a different species"). Of course, this does not entail that the killing, if 
justified, remained wrong. 
Second, I do not believe that the central claims of this Article depend upon acceptance of 
the "closure" conception of wrongdoing and justification. Although I defend a different 
conception of the justification/excuse distinction than does Gardner, see infra note 124 and 
accompanying text, it seems to me that his rejection of the closure view of justification does not, 
by itself, threaten either the structural equivalence thesis set forth in Part II of this Article, or 
the implications of that thesis spelled out in Parts III and IV. Again, however, I acknowledge 
that this contention is asserted but not defended. 
12. See, e.g., MODELPENAL CODE, Introduction to Art. 3, at 2-3 (1985) (observing that 
"the Code makes a rough analytical distinction between excuse and justification as defenses to a 
criminal prosecution," seeming to map that distinction onto the "ordinar[y]" view that justified 
conduct "is thought to be right, or at least not undesirable" and that excused conduct "is 
thought to be undesirable but that for some reason the actor is not to be blamed for it," and 
expressing "skepticism that any fine line between excuse and justification can sensibly be 
drawn" due to the presence of "troublesome borderline cases"); MOORE, supra note 8, at 483: 
[J]ustifications answer a different moral question than do excuses ... 
... When an action is justified, any prima facie wrongfulness is eliminated by the 
other (and good) attributes of the action; when an action is excused, it is still wrongful 
but the actor cannot be held responsible for it because she is not culpable. 
ALAN NORRIE, CRIME, REASON, AND HISTORY 154 (1993) ("[A]s a justification .... no wrong 
act has been done.... As an excuse..,. the focus moves from the question of the value of the 
act to the position, condition or circumstances of the actor and their effect on his culpability."); 
Laurence A. Alexander, Justification and Innocent Aggressors, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1177, 1177 
(1987) (stating excuse lies when the actor is "absolve[d] ... of responsibility," while justification 
lies when the actor engaged in "the morally correct action"); Burke, supra note 4, at 242-43 
("Justification defenses operate when the defendant's act is the morally preferred option.... In 
contrast, excuse defenses apply when the act itself is harmful, but when something about the 
actor relieves her of moral culpability for the wrongful act."); Joshua Dressier, New Thoughts 
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if imperfectly, by the maxim that criminal justifications speak to the 
act, whereas excuses speak to the actor.13 
Figure 1 
The Standard Account 
Morality Criminal Law 
Justification I Act not wrongful Act not wrongful 
Excuse Act wrongful but Actor Act wrongful but Actor 
not blameworthy not blameworthy 
About the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher's Thinking and 
Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61, 66 (1984) ("[A] justified act indicates at least that the 
conduct is not wrongful; an excuse concedes the wrongfulness of the act, but asserts that the 
actor should not be punished for her wrongful behavior, primarily because of psychological or 
situational involuntariness." (footnotes omitted)); Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of 
Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1897 (1984) ("If A's claim is that what he did 
was fully warranted... A offers a justification; if A acknowledges he acted wrongfully but 
claims he was not to blame ... he offers an excuse."); Heidi M. Hurd, Justification and Excuse, 
Wrongdoing and Culpability, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1551, 1558 (1999) ("Justified actions 
should be conceived of as right actions, while excused actions should be conceived of as wrong 
actions done nonculpably."); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of 
Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 318-19 (1996) ("Justifications are said to 
identify acts that produce morally preferred states of affairs .... Excuses, in contrast, are said to 
identify circumstances in which an act is wrongful but the actor blameless." (footnotes 
omitted)); David A.J. Richards, Self-Defense and Relations of Domination: Moral and Legal 
Perspectives on Battered Women Who Kill: Introduction, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 461, 462 (1996) 
("[A] person entitled to the defense [of justification], otherwise guilty of legal wrongdoing, has 
done nothing wrong. In contrast, a defense of excuse.., does not negative the wrongdoing of 
the act, but focuses on the lack of culpability of the offender ... "). 
The "not blameworthy" formulation applies, of course, to "full excuses." In cases of 
partial excuse, the actor is deemed (merely) "less blameworthy"-i.e., less blameworthy than is 
supposed paradigmatic for that offense. 
13. See, e.g., 1 PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL AW DEFENSES 100-01 (1984): 
Justified conduct is correct behavior that is encouraged or at least tolerated. In 
determining whether conduct is justified, the focus is on the act, not the actor. An 
excuse represents a legal conclusion that the conduct is wrong, undesirable, but that 
criminal liability is inappropriate because some characteristic of the actor vitiates 
society's desire to punish him .... The focus in excuses is on the actor. 
Michael D. Bayles, Reconceptualizing Necessity and Duress, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1191, 1203 
(1987): 
Generally, justifications admit that conduct satisfies the definition of an offense but 
the conduct is not wrongful since such conduct is justifiable in the totality of 
circumstances. Justifications focus on acts.... 
Excuses, on the other hand, admit that an actor's conduct is wrongful but we can not 
properly hold the actor responsible for his behavior. Excuses focus on the actor. 
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL AW, supra note 3, at 458-59. 
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This supposed distinction has provoked criminal law scholars to 
investigate nice moral questions. Two questions have predominated 
in the literature. First, is wrongfulness determined "subjectively" in 
terms of the actor's reasons for acting, or "objectively" in terms of 
facts independent of the actor's beliefs and motives-usually such 
facts as whether her deed in fact produces a net societal benefit or at 
least produces no socially recognized loss? Put another way, does 
wrongfulness depend upon "reasons" or "deeds"?14 Second, if 
wrongfulness is determined subjectively, is it true that actions are 
"justified" when the act is merely permissible, or must it be morally 
right?15 
These are, to be sure, interesting questions of moral theory. But, 
precisely for that reason, they do not speak to the logically prior issue 
with which we are here interested-namely, the nature of the 
conceptual distinction between justification and excuse for purposes 
of the criminal law. Insofar as that is our interest, we can safely 
bracket these much-debated questions of ethics. For, I shall argue, the 
distinction between justification and excuse, as concepts relevant to 
14. This opposition has been couched in a variety of ways. Most frequently, the line is 
drawn between subjective and objective theories of justification, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 12, 
at 1915-18, or reasons versus deeds, Paul H. Robinson, Competing Theories of Justification: 
Deeds vs. Reasons, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 45 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996). 
Other theorists speak in terms of agent-perspectival and objective theories, UNIACKE, supra 
note 11, at 17 & n.16; epistemic and non-epistemic theories, Hurd, supra note 12; and 
approaches based on explanatory reasons or guiding reasons, John Gardner, Justifications and 
Reasons, in HARM AND CULPABILITY, supra, at 103-06. 
I take all these formulations to aim at roughly the same distinction, namely that 
justifications could depend either on an actor's reasons for engaging in a prima facie wrong 
(even if those reasons are based on mistaken beliefs about the relevant facts), or on the actual 
state of affairs that the actor brings about. It is true that, by their plain terms, some of the 
pairings appear to contrast objective facts with the actor's beliefs, whereas others contrast 
objective facts with the actor's motives. This is a difference because even if A shoots B actually 
believing that if she does not then B will shoot C, it is possible that such a belief plays no part in 
motivating or explaining her decision to shoot B. But I assume that those non-objective 
approaches which formally turn on an actor's beliefs and not on her reasons recognize that her 
explanatory reasons are what matter and speak in terms of beliefs only because it's a more 
easily administered proxy. To signal that the conception of justification I defend can turn upon 
beliefs, reasons, objective facts, or on some combination of the three, I will generally refer 
interchangeably to "subjective" and "reasons" approaches on the one hand, and to "objective" 
and "deeds" theories on the other. To simplify, subjective and reasons theories of justification 
care about an actor's beliefs; objective and deeds theories do not. 
15. See, e.g., UNIACKE, supra note 11, at 9-56, 130-55 (contrasting permissible self-defense 
with permissible and moral self-defense); Dressier, supra note 12, at 81-87 (arguing that 
justifiable conduct is not just tolerable, but right in a moral sense); Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 
1904 (discussing the moral difficulty in claiming that less than ideal but still permissible acts 
are justified). 
This content downloaded from 130.91.146.35 on Wed, 8 Oct 2014 19:28:18 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2003] JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE 11 
the criminal law, cannot simply replicate or mirror the distinction that 
obtains in moral theory: the categories of morally and criminally 
justified conduct constitute overlapping but distinct sets. 
B. The Standard Account Rebutted 
Rebuttal of the standard account is straightforward. First, it is 
empirically false that the categories of morally and criminally justified 
conduct are extensionally identical. Second, there appears no basis 
for concluding that the extensional divergence is produced by any sort 
of conceptual error. Naturally, it remains open for one to argue that, 
for reasons of policy broadly construed, the substantive criminal law 
should be structured in such a way as to extend justification defenses 
to all, and to only, such conduct as is morally justified. Likewise, one 
could reasonably argue that the law should extend excuse defenses to 
all, and to only, such conduct as is morally excused. But any such 
arguments would be wholly normative; they provide no guidance for 
understanding the conceptual framework of defenses in those 
jurisdictions (probably all of them) that resist this advice. 
1. Not All Morally Justified Conduct Is Criminally Justified. 
Consider some familiar candidates for morally justified civil 
disobedience-say, the civil rights sit-ins, or medically indicated use 
of marijuana by severely ill persons, or distribution of hypodermic 
needles to drug addicts in order to combat the spread of AIDS, or the 
disruption of abortion clinics.16 In none of these cases is the defendant 
likely to have a valid legal defense. When the legislature can be 
understood to have already anticipated such possible claims of 
necessity, and nonetheless to have adopted, or refused to modify, a 
criminal ban, the necessity defense does not lie.17 And with good 
reason. As the commentary to the Model Penal Code (MPC) 
explains, the necessity defense carves out an across-the-board 
exception for those unanticipated circumstances in which the 
legislature would not want a general prohibition to apply.1s It is 
16. Actual cases involving these situations are discussed in SANFORD H. KADISH & 
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL AW AND ITS PROCESSES 865-67 (6th ed. 1995). 
17. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE ? 3.02(1)(c) (1962) (extending the necessity defense 
only so long as "a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not... 
plainly appear"). 
18. Id. ? 3.02(1) cmt. at 13; see also United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 
U.S. 483, 491 (2001) ("Under any conception of legal necessity, one principle is clear: The 
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therefore implicitly rejected for those circumstances that might have 
been more specifically accommodated, but were not. Consequently, 
in any of the above circumstances, a defendant's only hope for 
exculpation lies formally outside the doctrinal parameters of the 
substantive criminal law, as through the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion or jury nullification. At least some morally justified 
conduct, it seems, is not criminally justified.'9 
Advocates of the standard conceptualization of justifications 
could perhaps respond as follows: Even if many unlawful acts 
(perhaps or perhaps not including any of those listed above) are 
morally justified absent a legal prohibition, such acts cannot be 
morally justified in the face of a legal ban, given the moral imperative 
to obey the criminal law. 
Yet this response fails. First, the theory of political obligation 
upon which this attempt to save the substantive equivalence thesis 
rests is implausible. Let us suppose that, in any morally legitimate 
political system, criminal rules assume some moral force simply by 
virtue of their adoption, and that the mere existence of a criminal ban 
is therefore a consideration to be taken into account in the overall 
moral calculus. Nonetheless, very few legal or political theorists 
believe that the mere existence of a legal ban necessarily renders 
morally unjustified all action that would be morally justified in the 
strong sense absent the legal prohibition.20 Even if the existence of a 
criminal ban on given conduct always provides a reason not to engage 
in that conduct, and even if it would often constitute a reason of 
overriding force not to engage in it, for purposes of moral as opposed 
to legal analysis, it does not provide a necessarily decisive reason not 
to engage in it. 
Furthermore, the response fares no better even were we to adopt 
an account of political obligation pursuant to which disobedience to 
law is always and necessarily morally wrongful. True, this account 
defense cannot succeed when the legislature itself has made a 'determination of values.'" 
(quoting 1 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW ? 5.4, at 629 (1986))). 
19. I hope it is obvious that I am taking no position on which, if any, of the offered 
candidates for moral justification are actually morally justified under the best moral theory. If 
you think that none of these actions would be morally justified, feel free to supply your own 
favorite example of what you consider to be morally justified civil disobedience. The point will 
remain the same. 
20. For a clear and concise recent summary of the debate, see Leslie Green, Law and 
Obligations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 514 
(Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2001). 
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would seem to nullify the set of morally justified action that is 
criminal and not justified in law. But it does so as a mere tautology; it 
tells us nothing about the nature of justification defenses in the 
criminal law, which is precisely what criminal law theorists who mine 
this terrain are purporting to explore. Consequently, even if we are 
prepared to accept the strong version of political obligation, I think 
that criminal law theorists who equate justifications of morality with 
justifications of criminal law must be understood to be referring to 
what morality commands or permits as a pre-legal matter. They are 
not referring to what morality permits as a function of a substantive 
theory of political obligation married to the contingencies of what 
defenses the criminal law happens to confer. Contrary to the standard 
account, then, there can be morally justified actions that are not 
legally justified.21 
2. Not All Criminally Justified Conduct Is Morally Justified. A 
simple hypothetical demonstrates that the converse is true as well: 
Not all criminally justified conduct is morally justified. 
Imagine an actor, Albert, who employs deadly force in self- 
defense in circumstances in which completely safe retreat would have 
been easy. (To make matters more stark, assume if you like that the 
assailant, Bushrod, was old, deranged, and physically disabled, and 
21. As Austin put the point: 
Suppose an act innocuous, or positively beneficial, be prohibited by the sovereign 
under the penalty of death; if I commit this act, I shall be tried and condemned, and if 
I object to the sentence, that it is contrary to the law of God .... the Court of Justice 
will demonstrate the inconclusiveness of my reasoning by hanging me up, in 
pursuance of the law of which I have impugned the validity. 
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, Lecture V, at 133-34 (David 
Campbell and Philip Thomas eds., 1995) (1832). 
To be sure, the principle "lex injusta non est lex" (an unjust law is not a law) would 
seemingly entail that the putative law which denies a defense in cases of moral justification is 
not a "law" at all. Obviously, I cannot in this space seek to rebut this particular sort of natural 
law theory. But an extended discussion is probably unnecessary given the very real doubt that 
any modern theorist of natural law accepts this maxim. See generally Brian H. Bix, Natural Law: 
The Modern Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW, supra note 20, at 61. And even if that's not so, I am unaware of any proponent of the 
standard account of the justification/excuse distinction who defends that view as nothing more 
than a corollary of the lex injusta principle. Perhaps this is in part because the principle, even 
were it sound, would still not be quite enough to maintain the standard account; its adherents 
would still have to confront the challenge to be discussed in the immediately following 
subsection. That is, they would have to explain either why a criminal aw that extends a defense 
in cases of morally unjustified conduct is also not a "law," or why such defenses cannot count as 
a "justification" even as a matter of legal taxonomy. See infra notes 22-29 and 
accompanying text. 
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that Albert concedes after the fact that he was aware of the 
opportunity for safe retreat at the time.)22 If this occurred in one of 
the many jurisdictions that does not require retreat (especially from 
the actor's own home),23 Albert has a valid defense in law. On a 
consequentialist rationale, however, Albert's action was very 
probably not the right thing to do as retreat would have produced a 
net social benefit. If this is so, then Albert is not likely to be justified 
on an objective (or deeds) theory.24 A justification will be hard to 
support on a subjective (reasons) theory as well, for surely few 
nonconsequentialist moral theories would conclude that Albert acted 
rightly in choosing not to retreat. Indeed, it is at least arguable that he 
did not even act morally permissibly, in which case he would not even 
have a moral justification in the weak sense. It is very possible, in 
short, that Albert's perfect legal defense is not, morally speaking, a 
justification.25 
Of course, one can argue that Albert should not be granted a 
defense. But then we're engaged in substantive argument, not 
conceptual analysis. If we agree that the mere existence of the 
defense raises no logical or conceptual problem (regardless of 
whether it's good policy), it seems again that legal justifications are 
not identical to moral justifications. 
To recap, this brief argument against the substantive equivalence 
thesis has proceeded as follows: (1) The criminal law might grant a 
defense to someone who uses deadly force in self-defense even under 
22. The rudiments of this hypothetical are presented in Kent Greenawalt, Justifications, 
Excuses, and a Model Penal Code for Democratic Societies, 17 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 14, 25 
(1998). 
23. The Model Penal Code, for instance, imposes no duty on actors to retreat from their 
own homes, even when the assailant is a co-occupant. MODEL PENAL CODE ? 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(A) 
(1962). 
24. I assume here that objective theories of moral justification are likely to be 
consequentialist and subjective theories nonconsequentialist. My argument, however, does not 
depend upon this assumption. 
25. Another piece of evidence suggesting that conduct can be legally justified but not 
morally justified emerges from the facial difference between the "subjective" and "reasons" 
theories of justification. See supra note 14. Actual criminal codes often draft justification 
defenses to refer only to actors' beliefs, not to their motivation. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE 
? 3.02(1) (requiring that the actor believe his conduct to be necessary to qualify for 
justification). But a moral theory that evaluates conduct on the basis of something other than 
objective facts is almost certain to care about the actor's explanatory reasons, not only her 
beliefs. Paul Robinson takes this fact as some evidence of the conceptual poverty or confusion 
besetting current subjective approaches to justification, and thus as indirect support for a deeds 
theory. ROBINSON, supra note 13, at 49-50. It might instead be taken to reinforce the revised 
conception of criminal justifications introduced infra Part II. 
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circumstances in which he could easily have retreated; (2) such a 
defense, if granted, would be, legally speaking, a justification; but (3) 
on most plausible moral theories, such conduct would not be morally 
justified; therefore (4) not all legal justifications are moral 
justifications. But perhaps this conclusion is too hasty. If it is, the 
error seems most likely to lie with premise (2). That is, maybe if the 
criminal law recognizes a defense under the circumstances specified, 
that defense is not, as a matter of legal taxonomy, a justification. 
Maybe it is something else. And if it is something else, then this 
mundane example would not support the conclusion drawn. 
Now, if our supposed defense is not, legally, a justification, what 
else could it be? Recall that standard taxonomies of criminal law 
defenses endorsed by proponents of the substantive equivalence 
thesis contain three broad classes: justifications, excuses, and 
"nonexculpatory" defenses of law enforcement policy.26 Under this 
taxonomy, if Albert is not legally justified, then he is either legally 
excused or the beneficiary of a nonexculpatory defense. Let's 
consider these possibilities in turn. 
Unfortunately, the suggestion that Albert's defense is, legally, an 
excuse will not avail proponents of the substantive equivalence thesis. 
If Albert is legally excused, then, according to substantive 
equivalence, he must be morally excused too. But the assertion that 
Albert is excused as a moral matter-hence that his criminal defense 
is also, taxonomically, an excuse-is easily resisted. Why, after all, 
should those who believe that Albert's action was not morally 
justified-even in the weak sense of being morally permissible-agree 
that he is not morally blameworthy for the killing? It can't be because 
the criminal law permitted him to act as he did, for criminal law 
permissions surely do not confer moral blamelessness. Lots of 
blameworthy acts-lying, promise-breaking, many forms of gratuitous 
cruelty to animals-are criminally permissible. It is very plausible, 
therefore, to adjudge Albert blameworthy for sitting calmly in his 
chair, waiting patiently to kill the slowly advancing Bushrod. 
Furthermore, members of the community and legislators alike could 
unanimously agree that Albert's conduct was not morally justified in 
either strong or weak senses and that he was morally blameworthy, 
and nonetheless rationally continue to favor extending a defense in 
circumstances like Albert's. Decisionmakers could reasonably 
believe, for example, that most people will retreat if they can, no 
26. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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matter what the law allows, and fear that ex post adjudications of 
whether safe retreat would have been possible are too likely to 
produce false positives (thus resulting in punishment of morally and 
legally innocent persons) and to put excessive pressure on law- 
abiding folk to attempt retreats that are in fact unsafe.27 
So, if premise (2) fails, it must be because Albert's defense is a 
non-exculpatory defense of law enforcement policy.28 This possibility 
cannot be absolutely ruled out. But it comes at the cost of trivializing 
the very taxonomy of criminal law defenses that theorists of the 
justification/excuse distinction seem to think is so important. 
Defenses respond to, and are shaped by, a variety of considerations- 
such as whether the conduct is not morally wrongful; whether the 
actor, albeit engaged in morally wrongful conduct, is not likely to be 
morally blameworthy; and whether there exist reasons, apart from 
considerations of moral wrongfulness and moral blameworthiness, for 
not punishing the actor. This is clearly true. But so what? If this is all 
we can say, the enterprise of trying to categorize defenses becomes 
puzzling. A taxonomy should be more revealing than a bare list of 
reasons. Yet if the standard tripartite taxonomy of criminal law 
defenses is conceptually sound, and if Albert's defense29 falls within 
the nonexculpatory taxon as opposed to the justificatory taxon, the 
illuminating power of the taxonomy seems lost. It adds no apparent 
value to a mere laundry list of the diverse reasons for allowing any 
particular conduct or circumstances to serve as a defense to a 
criminal charge. 
27. These points are made in Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 25. 
28. Strictly speaking, this statement is too strong. If Albert's defense is, legally speaking, 
neither justification nor excuse, then it "must" be a nonexculpatory defense of law enforcement 
policy only so long as those three categories exhaust the relevant taxa. But it is always open for 
a proponent of substantive equivalence to avoid having to grant any proffered example of 
legally justified conduct that is not morally justified by simply multiplying the proposed 
categories of legal defenses. The response to such a move, though, would not be to demonstrate 
that the example cannot fall within any of the newly proposed taxa. This is a futile way to attack 
a moving target. The better response is to articulate and defend an alternative and more 
satisfying way to conceive of legal justification which covers the example in question. That is the 
task for Part II. 
29. Notice that the fact that Albert could have safely retreated and chose not to is not a 
necessary condition for satisfaction of the nominal legal defense that Albert will invoke-self- 
defense. Had Albert been inclined to retreat but then (accurately) determined that safe retreat 
would have been impossible, he would still be exculpated on grounds of self-defense. And in 
that circumstance, he probably would be morally justified. So to treat Albert's defense as 
nonexculpatory is implicitly to maintain that self-defense is sometimes a legal justification and 
sometimes a nonexculpatory defense, depending upon the facts of the individual case. 
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Furthermore, Albert's defense just doesn't look very much like 
the other defenses customarily placed in the third category-e.g., 
statute of limitations, diplomatic immunity, double jeopardy. These 
latter defenses appear united by a family of systemic concerns of a 
different character than the sorts of worries that might support 
extending self-defense to protect Albert in his killing of Bushrod. 
This is highly impressionistic, to be sure. But if there is truth to it, 
then to clump all these varied sorts of defenses under one heading 
threatens to turn this third category into a shapeless residual 
category, drained of whatever coherence it might otherwise possess. 
These two considerations, perhaps among others, may help explain 
why no theorist of whom I am aware has proposed that any part of 
self-defense be classified as something other than either justification 
or excuse. 
In sum, then, Albert has a valid criminal defense, even though, 
very possibly, his conduct is neither morally justified (strongly or 
weakly, objectively or subjectively), nor morally excusable. At the 
risk of belaboring the point: Because the particular reasons why it 
might be morally appropriate for the state to recognize a legal 
justification are so heavily dependent upon such considerations as the 
supposed inferior epistemic access enjoyed by post hoc factfinders 
relative to the actor herself, they simply need not bear upon the 
moral character of the actor's conduct. And the supposition that this 
defense is not a justification, but rather falls within the third category 
of defenses involving "law enforcement policy," threatens to divest 
the proposed taxonomy of criminal law defenses of conceptual as well 
as practical interest. The most likely possibility is simply that Albert's 
defense is, legally speaking, a justification, and therefore that 
justification defenses need not be limited to morally justified conduct. 
3. Summary. These brief examples demonstrate two things, 
neither of which should surprise. First, conduct that is morally 
justified on most theories of moral justification can lack any defense 
under the criminal law. Second, a legal defense that seems most 
intuitively classified as a justification can cover conduct that is not 
morally justified on any plausible theory of moral justification. It 
follows that, if there exists any sound and coherent distinction 
between justification and excuse for purposes of the criminal law, it 
cannot simply mimic the distinction conventionally supposed to exist 
in ethics. The standard account is wrong. 
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II. MORAL THEORY AND THE STRUCTURAL EQUIVALENCE THESIS 
Happily, there is an obvious response. Morality and criminal law 
are both normative systems. In each, it is true that a claim of 
justification defeats the prima facie judgment that the actor has 
violated a norm, and that a claim of excuse defeats the presumption 
that the actor is normatively responsible for the violation of a norm. 
Thus justification and excuse are generic concepts in normative 
reasoning, serving the same logical function in law and in morals. But 
if so, they necessarily have different meanings in the two systems to 
the extent of the substantive differences between the two systems in 
terms of, respectively, the content of the prohibitory norms, and the 
principles of ascription. 
Section A introduces what it means for justifications and excuses 
to serve structurally or logically equivalent functions within the 
normative systems of conventional morality and positive criminal law, 
while differing in substantive content. Section B briefly elaborates 
upon the structural equivalence thesis by situating this revised 
account in the justification/excuse literature. In doing so, it sketches a 
rough taxonomy of existing criminal law defenses. Section C 
confronts one important question that the revised account raises- 
namely, how we can determine whether a given defense is better 
understood as qualifying a prima facie norm (hence is conceptually a 
justification) or as foreclosing punishment for violation of a norm 
(hence is conceptually an excuse). 
A. The Revised Account Introduced 
The conventional view in moral theory holds that a justification 
serves to qualify a moral norm so as to provide moral permission for 
conduct that would be presumptively wrongful.30 According to what I 
will call "the structural equivalence thesis," then, a justification within 
the criminal law means that conduct which appears at first blush to be 
criminal does not, all things considered, violate the law. In contrast, 
an excuse means that it is criminal but not punistiable. (See Figure 2.) 
Under this view, justifications serve to qualify the norm for purposes 
both of ex post evaluation and ex ante direction. They supplement the 
prima facie norm so as to instruct the addressees regarding what 
conduct the discourse allows. Excuses serve, only ex post, to relieve 
30. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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an actor of responsibility-in the one system, moral responsibility, in 
the other, criminal responsibility-for having violated a norm.31 
Figure 2 
The Revised Account 
Meaning Within Normative System 
Claim Normative Morality Criminal Law 
Significance 
Justification Defeats Not wrongful Not criminal 
norm violation 
Excuse Defeats Wrongful, but not Criminal, but not 
responsibility blameworthy punishable 
That the distinction between "not criminal" (i.e., justified) and 
"criminal but not punishable" (i.e., excused) is not purely nominal is 
well illustrated by the storied case of Dudley and Stephens.32 Charged 
with murder for killing and eating the cabin boy while shipwrecked, 
the defendants had claimed that their conduct was necessary to avoid 
starvation.33 The court denied the defense. As Lord Coleridge 
explained: 
We are often compelled to set up standards we cannot reach 
ourselves, and to lay down rules which we could not ourselves 
satisfy. But a man has no right to declare temptation to be an 
excuse, though he might himself have yielded to it, nor allow 
compassion for the criminal to change or weaken in any manner the 
legal definition of the crime.34 
Although the Dudley and Stephens court famously did not distinguish 
between justification and excuse,35 once these terms are distinguished 
31. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 8, at 405 (remarking on the conceptual priority of 
forward-looking norms of wrongdoing over the backward-looking judgments of culpability). 
32. The Queen v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884). 
33. Id. at 273. 
34. Id. at 288. 
35. The court had posed the issue thus: 
Now it is admitted that the deliberate killing of this unoffending and unresisting boy 
was clearly murder, unless the killing can be justified by some well-recognised excuse 
admitted by the law. It is further admitted that there was in this case no such excuse, 
unless the killing was justified by what has been called "necessity."... 
It must not be supposed that in refusing to admit temptation to be an excuse for crime 
it is forgotten how terrible the temptation was; how awful the suffering; how hard in 
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and the issue of justification is explored, the question becomes 
whether the criminal law should permit (or should be interpreted to 
permit) killing under the circumstances of the case.36 Affirmative and 
negative answers could each be supported. But even if we accept 
arguendo the court's judgment that Dudley and Stephens did violate 
the criminal law, the question remains whether the court should 
refrain from punishing them out of "compassion for the criminal" on 
the grounds that they are not deserving of blame. To be sure, the 
granting of an excuse (criminal but not punishable) would, as a 
practical matter, "weaken" the criminal ban. But it would not, as a 
logical or conceptual matter, "change... the legal definition." It 
would have been perfectly coherent for the court to have determined 
that Dudley and Stephens did violate the law (i.e., were not legally 
justified) but nonetheless should not be punished because they were 
not blameworthy (i.e., were legally excused). This would not have 
been identical, in either logic or social meaning, to a judgment that 
the defendants did not violate the criminal law, even though the most 
salient practical consequence-the defendants' exculpation-would 
have been the same in both cases.37 
B. The Revised Account Situated 
I expect this distinction is neither unclear nor controversial. 
Indeed, I readily acknowledge that the revised conceptualization here 
advanced-what I have termed the "structural equivalence" thesis- 
is not a radical innovation. Remarks to similar effect can be found 
such trials to keep the judgment straight and the conduct pure.... But a man has no 
right to declare temptation to be an excuse, though he might himself have yielded to 
it.... It is therefore our duty to declare that the prisoners' act in this case was willful 
murder, that the facts as stated in the verdict are no legal justification of the homicide. 
Id. at 286-88 (emphases added). 
36. Those circumstances could be defined, variously, as those in which there existed 
objective necessity, or in which the actors actually believed there to be necessity, or in which they 
actually and reasonably believed there to be necessity. For present purposes, the distinctions are 
of no moment. Notwithstanding some efforts by the court to problematize the issue, it seems 
fairly clear that all three conditions were satisfied. 
37. J.C. Smith is therefore mistaken to charge that "[i]t is begging the question to declare 
that [the Lordships] cannot 'allow compassion for the criminal to change or weaken in any 
manner the definition of crime,' when the very issue before them is whether the person charged 
is a criminal and whether the definition of crime extends to his case." J.C. SMITH, 
JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE IN THE CRIMINAL AW 93 (1989). "The very issue" is, rather, two 
separate issues that must be teased apart. A holding that the defendants were not justified 
amounts to a conclusion that their conduct falls within the (complete) definition of the crime. 
But such a judgment would not be inconsistent with a further judgment that compassion for 
them warrants not labeling either "a criminal." 
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scattered throughout the literature. Perhaps most notably, H.L.A. 
Hart explained that "[i]n the case of 'justification' what is done is 
regarded as something which the law does not condemn, or even 
welcomes," whereas excuses lie when "the psychological state of the 
agent..,. exemplified one or more of a variety of conditions which are 
held to rule out the public condemnation and punishment of 
individuals."38 And as one respected American casebook puts it: 
"Justification defenses state exceptions to the prohibitions laid down 
by specific offenses.... They qualify and refine the proscriptions of 
the penal law.... [D]octrines of excuse..,. recognize claims that 
particular individuals cannot fairly be blamed for admittedly wrongful 
conduct."39 Several points need be made, though. 
First, mere recitation of this view is no guarantee of 
understanding. One California court, for instance, succinctly stated: 
"Justification declares the allegedly criminal act legal; excuse admits 
the act's criminality but declares the allegedly criminal actor not to be 
worthy of blame."40 But it immediately proceeded to conclude: 
"Therefore, justification requires an objective evaluation of the 
allegedly criminal act; excuse requires only a subjective evaluation of 
the allegedly criminal state of mind."41 As I will explain in detail 
below, this is a non sequitur.42 More generally, it is not uncommon for 
38. HART, supra note 10, at 13-14 (footnotes omitted). 
39. RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL AW 324 (1997). 
40. People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
41. Id. 
42. See infra Part III. For another illustration, see DOUGLAS N. HIUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF 
CRIMINAL AW 187-223 (1987). Husak begins with a clear and, to my mind, seemingly accurate 
statement of justification: "A defendant who alleges a justification contends that his conduct 
was not legally wrongful in his particular circumstances, even though it may (or may not) have 
satisfied each of the elements of a criminal offense." Id. at 189. Later, though, he concludes that 
because "[j]ustifications... show conduct not to be wrongful... there is no reason why they 
cannot be shared by confederates." Id. at 205. Strictly speaking this is true. But nobody suggests 
that justifications "cannot" be shared by confederates; the disputed question, I think, is only 
whether it can be the case that justifications "are not" shared by confederates. It is this that I 
take Husak to be denying. Put otherwise, Husak seems to be contending that because 
"[j]ustifications ... show conduct not to be wrongful," they must be shared by confederates. 
However, the simple claim that justifications must be shared by confederates is false. See Part 
IV.A. 
Perhaps Husak's conclusion (as I have recharacterized it) would follow from his premise 
were we to assume an objective theory of justification. That is, the "conduct" that a defendant 
who alleges a justification defense contends was "not legally wrongful" may be limited, in 
Husak's view, to aspects of behavior not including the actor's mental states. See, e.g., Douglas N. 
Husak, Justifications and the Criminal Liability ofAccessories, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
491, 496 (1989) ("Justifications are defenses that arise from properties or characteristics of acts; 
excuses are defenses that arise from properties or characteristics of actors."). But, of course, this 
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an author to define justification in both legal and moral terms, in 
which event the whole significance of the shift from the standard to 
the revised conception is lost.43 
Second, even those who appear to adopt what I have called the 
revised view and might understand its implications (on which, more 
shortly) generally appear not to recognize that it is far from the 
prevailing understanding in the scholarly community.44 As a 
is not how "conduct" must be understood. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE ? 1.13(5) (1962) 
(defining "conduct" to mean "an action or omission and its accompanying state of mind"). 
Moreover, as Part III endeavors to show, it is not how justifications must be understood. Notice 
this, then: What appears on first or even second glance to be a straightforward articulation of 
what I have labeled the revised account of justification ("A defendant who alleges a justification 
contends that his conduct was not legally wrongful in his particular circumstances...") may, 
instead, be intended to incorporate within it, as a definitional matter, contestable and contested 
substantive claims. 
43. Consider in this respect the influential work of Kent Greenawalt, whose writing on the 
distinction between justification and excuse is especially subtle and insightful. In his much 
praised 1984 article, Greenawalt observed that, "[i]f the law's central distinction between 
justification and excuse is to follow ordinary usage, it will be drawn in terms of warranted and 
unwarranted behavior." Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 1903. Although it's not clear on its face 
whether this refers to morally warranted and unwarranted behavior (per the substantive 
equivalence thesis) or legally warranted and unwarranted behavior, the context strongly conveys 
the former. This is certainly how Greenawalt is often understood. See, e.g., Garrett Epps, Any 
Which Way But Loose: Interpretive Strategies and Attitudes Toward Violence in the Evolution of 
the Anglo-American "Retreat Rule", 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 303, 305 (Winter 1992) 
("Professor Greenawalt argues that a justified action is 'warranted' and 'morally appropriate,' 
while an excusable action is merely 'not blameworthy' because the person who commits it is not 
'fully responsible.'" (footnote omitted)); Hurd, supra note 12, at 1563-64 (reading Greenawalt 
to endorse a subjective theory of moral justification). Fourteen years later, Greenawalt 
reiterated his central claims in a shorter article, now writing that, for purposes of the criminal 
law, "[a] claim of justification is a claim that one's act was warranted, that what one did was 
right, or was within a legally permissible range of behavior." Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 16 
(footnote omitted). Unfortunately, the notoriously ambiguous "or" makes this sentence 
susceptible to a range of interpretations. Least plausibly, the passage could be suggesting a 
three-part disjunction, such that a justification defense lies when one's action is "warranted" or 
morally right or legally permissible. Alternatively, it could mean that, for purposes of criminal 
law, "warranted" is synonymous with legally right, which is synonymous with "within a legally 
permissible range of behavior." But surely the most natural reading holds that an action is 
"warranted"-hence legally justified-if it is either "right" or "legally permissible," in which 
case right must mean something other than legally permissible--hence, presumably, morally 
right. For Greenawalt to define legal justifications explicitly in terms of legal permissibility is, in 
sum, a welcome advance. However, in my view, his definition will remain imprecise and 
misleading so long as it includes reference (however veiled) to moral rightness. Better to follow 
Donald Horowitz's advice that we "begin the discussion of exculpation" by "ban[ning] words 
like warranted." Donald Horowitz, Justification and Excuse in the Program of Criminal Law, 49 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 110 (Summer 1986). 
44. One possible exception is B. Sharon Byrd, Wrongdoing and Attribution: Implications 
Beyond the Justification-Excuse Distinction, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1289 (1987), a largely astute 
analysis that warrants more attention than it has apparently received. 
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consequence, we find a great many commentators observing simply 
that justifications mean that the conduct is "not wrongful"-with 
most apparently intending "not morally wrongful," a small minority 
perhaps thinking "not criminally wrongful," and the great majority, I 
suspect, reading other unqualified references (without an eye for their 
ambiguity) as conveying whatever meaning the author herself 
favors.45 My objective, therefore, is to identify these two views, to 
argue for the second, and to demonstrate why it matters.46 
Third and relatedly, even those who correctly define criminal law 
justifications as defeating criminality, as distinct from moral 
wrongfulness, most often also define criminal law excuses as defeating 
blameworthiness.47 This suggests a conception of the 
justification/excuse distinction that operates as a middle ground 
between the standard formulation we have rejected and the revised 
view just put forward. (See Figure 3.) This is intuitively sensible. And 
yet, if true, it might seem to throw into doubt my earlier claim that 
justification and excuse are generic concepts of normative reasoning, 
serving the same logical function in morality and criminal law. It is 
easy enough to appreciate either substantive equivalence (per the 
standard account) or structural equivalence (per the revised account). 
But this third matrix has the air of compromise about it. And where 
compromise can so easily reign, strong claims of conceptual logic 
often stand on shaky footing. How can we be so sure that justification 
defenses in the criminal law have no necessary relationship to notions 
of moral wrongfulness if excuse defenses under the same system 
mean nothing other than that the defendant is morally blameless? 
Some thoughts about this issue might enable us to understand more 
clearly the relationship between legal and moral categories. 
45. Compare the ambiguity that the traditional M'Naghten rule of legal insanity produces 
in providing that the defendant must be exculpated if he did not know the nature of his act or 
did not know that it was wrong. Many courts and commentators have noted the question 
whether this means morally wrong or legally wrong. See, e.g., 2 JAMES F. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF 
THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 167 (1883). Surely, though, many others have simply failed 
to notice a difficulty. 
46. I do not mean to imply that there exist only two versions of the justification/excuse 
distinction. Quite the contrary. Indeed, the leading English criminal law casebook offers this 
third view: "An act is justified when we positively approve of it. It is merely excused when we 
disapprove of it but think it is not right to treat it as a crime." SMITH & HOGAN, CRIMINAL 
LAW 189 (9th ed. 1999). 
47. See, e.g., supra notes 39 and 40 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 3 
The Compromise Account 
Meaning Within Normative System 
Claim 
Normativei Morality 
Criminal Law 
Significance 
Justification Defeats norm Not wrongful Not criminal 
violation _ 
Excuse Defeats Wrongful but not Criminal but not 
responsibiliy blameworthy blameworthy 
Let me start by proposing a rough, incomplete, and tentative 
taxonomy of defenses under the criminal law, one that distinguishes 
conduct that is "not prohibited" from prohibited conduct for which 
the defendant is "not punishable," and then subdivides the latter 
category into defenses stemming from the defendant's supposed "lack 
of moral blameworthiness," and those based on other reasons of "law 
enforcement policy." (See Figure 4.) Two aspects of the diagram are 
immediately striking.48 First, in contrast to the prevailing three-part 
schema of justification, excuse, and law enforcement (or 
"nonexculpatory") defenses,49 my taxonomy divides the relevant 
universe into just two broad classes. Second, the concept of "excuse" 
appears at two discrete levels in the hierarchy-corresponding to 
moral excuse and legal excuse.50 
48. A third feature that is worth remarking upon concerns the subject being taxonomized. 
What is a "defense," and how does one compare to a claim that serves to rebut elements of the 
offense? Now, there may indeed be strong conceptual or normative bases upon which to sort 
given elements into one category or the other. But the perspective reflected in the diagram is 
purely positive: a defense, on this view, is a claim that arises after the commission of the offense 
has been established, which is to say that it concedes (at least arguendo) a prima facie 
violation-i.e., an "infringement"-of the criminal aw. See infra note 117. 
49. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
50. I should here acknowledge an alternative taxonomy, pursuant o which the first level of 
the hierarchy-for purposes of ethics and the criminal law-would be divided into three 
categories: justified (not prohibited), excused (not punishable), and not responsible (for reason 
of lack of moral/legal agency). Put another way, agency defects could be reconceived as standing 
on the first level of the hierarchy rather than the third. Both schemata are plausible. The critical 
point advanced in text remains valid under either. 
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The lesson to be drawn is just how complexly moral concepts play out 
in the criminal law. Insofar as concepts used in moral discourse really 
signify generic features of the structure or logic of normative 
reasoning, those same concepts are likely to reappear in the criminal 
law. In both systems, the concepts will share logical meaning but 
differ in substantive content. (As already intimated, the term 
"wrongful" supplies a prime example. Unmodified, it is generally 
taken to mean "morally wrongful." But the mere fact that it could be 
thus qualified without redundancy indicates that it is really a generic 
normative concept that exists across normative discourses-hence 
"criminally wrongful.""5•) However, the criminal law is not only a 
normative system analogous to the system of ethics. It also, in diverse 
and complicated manners, incorporates or operates upon the 
substantive judgments made within the system of ethics. I will not try 
to sort out the variety of ways this occurs. At the least, and very 
generally, it is enough to understand that moral concepts serve both 
as analogues to legal concepts (performing the same function within 
the logic of the respective normative systems) and as the content or 
substance of legal rules. The standard negative retributivist account of 
the criminal law holds that individuals should be legally excused when 
they are not morally blameworthy.52 This is a substantive position. It 
51. I have argued elsewhere that the same could be said about the term "coercive." See 
Mitchell N. Berman, The Normative Functions of Coercion Claims, 8 LEGAL THEORY 45, 53-55 
(2002), It bears emphasis that to recognize that concepts like "wrongful," "right," and 
"coercive" serve analogous functions within the logics of criminal law and morality is not simply 
to reiterate the commonplace that "law and morals share a vocabulary so that there are both 
legal and moral obligations, duties, and rights." H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 7 (2d ed. 
1994); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459-60 
(1897): 
The law is full of phraseology drawn from morals, and by the mere force of language 
continually invites us to pass from one domain to the other without perceiving it, as 
we are sure to do unless we have the boundary constantly before our minds. The law 
talks about rights, and duties, and malice, and intent, and negligence, and so forth, 
and nothing is easier, or, I may say, more common in legal reasoning, than to take 
these words in their moral sense, at some stage of the argument, and so to drop into 
fallacy. 
52. The term "negative retributivism" is introduced in J.L. Mackie, Morality and the 
Retributive Emotions, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 4 (1982). It is distinguished from what is often 
considered retributivism simpliciter (but might with greater precision be divided into 
"permissive retributivism" and "positive retributivism") in not claiming that the moral 
blameworthiness that attaches to antisocial conduct either provides a sufficient justification for 
instituting a system of criminal punishment or provides an affirmative reason of any sort for 
imposing punishment in a given case. Id. Perhaps better termed "side-constraint retributivism," 
it says only that an offender's lack of blameworthiness renders it unjust to punish him (and may 
also claim that it is unjust to punish an offender in excess of his desert). 
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is not one that can be advanced by conceptual argumentation about 
what it means to have a legal excuse. 
Put otherwise, the compromise account of justification and 
excuse (reflected in Figure 3) is accurate only because, and to the 
extent that, the criminal law decides as a substantive matter to restrict 
punishment to persons who are morally blameworthy for their 
criminal acts, in the dual sense that they were the types of agents who 
are proper bearers of moral ascriptions and that they were morally 
culpable for acting as they did.53 That is, insofar as excuses bear the 
same meaning under the criminal law as they do in moral theory, that 
is for substantive, contingent reasons, not for conceptual ones. For 
those-H.L.A. Hart most famously54-who deny that imposition of 
criminal punishment must be limited to persons who are morally 
blameworthy, it remains true that a criminal law excuse denotes non- 
punishability, not non-blameworthiness. It follows that even negative 
retributivists do better to recognize that criminal law excuses mean 
only that the defendant should not be punished, although absence of 
blameworthiness might well constitute a principal, perhaps sufficient, 
reason why he should not be punished. 
Similar remarks apply to justification. It is perfectly appropriate 
to argue about such matters as whether an actor should be legally 
justified whenever his conduct is morally justified (in a strong or weak 
sense), and whether legal justification should be withheld from actors 
whose conduct is not morally justified even in the weak sense of being 
morally permissible. The important thing to understand is that such 
positions are advanced, and resisted, by substantive moral argument 
and by practical reasoning, not by conceptual analysis."5 So, even if we 
53. This distinction between moral agency and culpability is succinctly put in MOORE, 
supra note 8, at 403. For an apparently comparable distinction, see Stephen Shute et al., 
Introduction: The Logic of Criminal Law, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 1, 16 
(Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993) (distinguishing prima facie responsibility from all-things- 
considered responsibility). 
54. See HART, supra note 10, at 28-53 (arguing that voluntary action, but not moral 
blameworthiness, should be a precondition for imposition of criminal punishment). 
55. It is this point that Jeremy Horder's proposed taxonomy, see Jeremy Horder, Self- 
Defence, Necessity, and Duress: Understanding the Relationship, 11 CANADIAN J.L. & 
JURISPRUDENCE 143 (1998), by which the defenses of necessity, duress, and self-defense are 
associated with, or identified by, a particular principle or "key issue"-respectively, the moral 
imperative to act, the personal sacrifice demanded of the actor, and the legal permission to act, 
id. at 143-threatens to obscure. If my account here is correct, then the legal permission to act is 
what defines all defenses that fall under the more general conceptual rubric of justification. 
Within the broad category of justifications, there are then different (yet potentially overlapping) 
reasons of policy for recognizing particular defenses. Defenses of necessity are recognized, as 
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find it more convenient to reserve the label of "excuse" for those 
defenses that signal the defendant's lack of moral responsibility (in 
the twin senses of lack of moral agency and lack of moral 
blameworthiness), that does not throw into doubt my claim that 
criminal law justifications signal only absence of criminality, not 
absence of moral wrongfulness, which is the point I most want to 
insist upon.56 
Horder says, because of the "overriding reasons" that support acting in cases of necessity. Id. at 
155. Defenses involving use of force against attackers might then be recognized for a host of 
reasons, including the presence of overriding reasons, and because refusing to do so could 
threaten to undermine popular support for the law. As we have seen, actions that are driven by 
moral imperative might nonetheless fall outside the scope of any legal defense. In these cases, 
the absence of legal permission entails the absence of a necessity defense notwithstanding the 
actual (or arguable) moral imperative. 
56. Another way to appreciate this claim is to examine George Fletcher's reasons for 
concluding otherwise. Fletcher starts by arguing that legal norms should approximate moral 
norms. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 93-110 (1998). 
However, if this is not a conceptual claim about the criminal law, but rather a normative 
argument to be pressed to legislators, then no matter how closely justifications under the 
criminal aw should conform to moral justifications, all that can be said as a conceptual matter is 
this: "If the legislature has authority to define the 'elements of the offense', then it should have 
the same authority over the negative elements we call claims of justification." George P. 
Fletcher, The Nature of Justification, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL AW, supra note 53, 
at 176. To understand why Fletcher resists this conclusion, one need recognize the depth of his 
commitment to a particular jurisprudential position about the proper structure of legal 
reasoning. He explains: 
Flat legal discourse proceeds in a single stage, marked by the application of a legal 
norm that invokes all of the criteria relevant to the resolution of a dispute. Structured 
legal discourse proceeds in two stages: first, an absolute norm is asserted; and second, 
qualifications enter to restrict the scope of the supposedly dispositive norm. 
Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, supra note 3, at 951. See generally George P. Fletcher, 
Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970 (1981). Structured legal reasoning, Fletcher 
argues, is superior to flat. Flat reasoning, which would view a justification defense as merely 
negating the offense is, Fletcher says, to treat killing a human in self-defense like killing a fly. 
See, e.g., FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL AW, supra, at 80; Fletcher, The Nature of 
Justification, supra, at 183; Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, supra note 3, at 977. That, of 
course, is not faithful to meaningful aspects of our experience. A "positivist" conception of 
justification that divorces justification defenses from any necessary relation to moral 
wrongfulness "holds that there is no conceptual structure in the criminal law at all." Fletcher, 
The Nature of Justification, supra, at 176. And because there is a conceptual structure, he 
concludes, the positivist account must be wrong. See id. at 176-77 (criticizing "positivists" for 
being unable to "concede the existence of distinctions immanent in the law"). 
The problem, I think, is that Fletcher is conflating two separate points. The first is that the logic 
of the criminal law should distinguish between (prima facie) "infringements" and (all-things- 
considered) "violations," the second being that infringements are prevented from becoming 
violations by the presence of a moral justification. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, Some 
Ruminations on Rights, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 45, 47 (1977). Yet there is no necessary connection 
between them. That there may be "a structural distinction between elements of the offence and 
claims of justification" which "acquire[s] [its] appeal..,. from [its] intrinsic plausibility," 
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C. Identifying Permissions 
I have argued to this point that a justification defense within the 
criminal law has no necessary connection to the substantive claims of 
morality but, instead, constitutes an exception to the criminal law 
offenses in the sense of permitting conduct that an offense by its 
terms prohibits. To some extent, though, this argument has merely 
shifted the inquiry. If a given defense of positive law is a justification 
if and only if it confers all-things-considered legal permission, and an 
excuse if and only if it establishes that an actor is not punishable 
notwithstanding that her behavior was not legally permitted, then a 
successful classification depends upon our ability to determine when a 
defense does in fact qualify a prohibition so as to confer legal 
permission. That is to say, for example: Is the defendant who is 
exculpated on grounds of self-defense exculpated because her 
conduct was legally permissible (hence justified) or because she is not 
punishable (hence excused) for engaging in conduct that was legally 
impermissible? Precisely how such a determination should proceed is 
not quite so obvious as one might suppose. 
1. Of Form and Substance. The central question is this: Are the 
contours of a legal norm determined formally or substantively? If 
formally, then a permission is whatever the penal code says it is. Thus, 
if a defense is drafted to provide that "it is not an offense if . . . ." or 
"however, an actor shall be permitted to... ." or something similar, 
then that defense qualifies the norm, hence is a justification. In 
contrast, a defense which specifies "however, an actor shall not be 
punished if...." confers an excuse. 
Fletcher, The Nature of Justification, supra, at 176, does not entail-what is the present 
question-that elements and justifications in the criminal law must have some particular 
substantive content. One can acknowledge that there exists a conceptual structure, or logic, 
underlying the law by which a prima facie norm (the offense) is qualified by justification 
defenses which establish that, all-things-considered, the norm is not violated, and still deny both 
that "[a] statutory definition should be understood as an approximation, by rule, of a principled 
understanding of wrongful conduct," id. at 177, and that moral justification need defeat the 
prima facie offense. The first claim is incorrect because the conceptual structure of the criminal 
law allows for mala prohibita, and the second is incorrect because, given the inescapable over- 
and underinclusiveness of articulated rules (among other reasons), a legislature could 
reasonably decide to restrict the scope of moral justifications that serve as legal justifications. 
Simply put, the revised conception of justification defenses need not deny the conceptual 
distinction between infringement and violation, but only that the content of legal infringement 
and violation need track the content of moral infringement and violation. 
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The obvious problem confronting the formal solution is that few 
defenses are written in a fashion that resolves the problem. Most say 
simply that "it shall be a defense that... ." Such language provides 
no help at all. Many modern codes, it is true, explicitly classify their 
defenses under the headings of justification or excuse, or incorporate 
this terminology into the formulation of individual defenses: "an actor 
shall be justified [or excused] if... ." But this too cannot always be 
dispositive of the question whether the defense is indeed a 
justification or excuse, lest the conceptual inquiry be displaced by a 
wholly empirical one. For these reasons, a purely formal solution to 
the classificatory question seems unpromising. 
The alternative, then, must be that there exists some sort of 
substantive metric that determines the contours of the prohibitory 
norms that comprise the criminal law. That is not to contradict the 
observation in Part I that the criminal law need not, and does not, 
incorporate the substantive judgments supplied by the realm of 
morals. Instead, we look to a substantive metric that derives from the 
criminal law's challenge of regulating conduct by means of 
punishment against a background of fallible institutions. Only by 
understanding the judgments of right, wrong, and permissible that 
particular jurisdictions make-assuming that the criminal law in a 
given jurisdiction satisfies some minimal standards of internal 
coherence or integrity-can we determine whether or not a defense is 
intended to function as a permission even if the language of the 
defense provides no guidance. This is an approach, then, that owes 
more to sociology and empirical political science than to moral or 
legal theory. To take our earlier example, anyone with a passing 
understanding of our legal culture is likely to interpret the substantive 
criminal law as intended to permit persons to use (nondeadly) force 
as necessary to ward off a mugger or rapist. If so, then at least these 
core instances of self-defense are, in our criminal law, justifications. 
But are these judgments merely interstitial or defeasible, 
enabling judgments only unless or until a defense is written in terms 
that specifically grant permission or except conduct from the reach of 
the criminal law? Suppose a provision of the penal code says: "For 
purposes of the criminal law, it is permissible for a child under the age 
of seven to engage in an act that would be a criminal offense were the 
child over the age of 18."57 Does the fact that the defense assumes the 
57. I am indebted to Peter Westen both for this example and for challenging me on 
this issue. 
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form of a permission necessarily determine that it's a justification 
rather than an excuse? 
I think not. We can test our intuitions by imagining that we 
carefully explained the distinction between (a) an exception from a 
prohibitory norm and (b) a constraint on application of punishment 
(including the censure that a judgment of norm-violation brings) to 
the drafters. Would they have reason to consider it (a) rather than 
(b)? Surely they could. They could, for example, believe it 
advantageous for the full flowering of human individuality that young 
children experiment with conduct that the law prohibits of them later 
in life. If so, then the defense really is a permission, hence a 
justification rather than an excuse. But absent this or a similarly 
unlikely story, we would probably conclude that the substantive 
principles of this particular normative regime do disallow this 
conduct. Notwithstanding its somewhat unfortunate language, we 
would suppose, the nominal permission really grants an excuse-an 
excuse grounded, most likely, on the judgment that young children 
are (at best) only imperfect moral agents. 
More generally, this sociologically informed alternative differs 
from a purely formalistic effort to tell us just what are the 
justifications and what are the excuses in the criminal law of any given 
jurisdiction precisely in its being subject to the demand of reason- 
giving in this way. Moving from formalism to what is a form of 
sociological jurisprudence has the consequence that whether a 
particular defense is a justification, or, instead, is an excuse no longer 
depends solely upon the vagaries of statutory drafting. Instead, where 
a particular defense fits within this conceptual structure becomes 
something that can be interrogated. Further, this feature does impose 
constraints, because the creators and conservators of the legal system 
being investigated must be able to give reasons in support of one or 
another understanding of the functional role that a given defense 
plays. This critically distinguishes the formalist approach, which takes 
the language of the statutory scheme at face value and imposes no 
demand of intelligible reason-giving. Because of this distinction, 
sociological jurisprudence leaves the content of particular penal codes 
open-ended, but, unlike formalism, not completely so.58 
58. In emphasizing the difference between a substantive, sociologically informed 
understanding of the criminal law's norms and a merely formal one, I should not be understood 
to be collapsing the difference between structural and substantive equivalence. To undertake an 
empirical inquiry into the content of the substantive norms of a given criminal law regime is 
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2. Conduct Rules, Decision Rules, and Acoustic Separation. I 
have just argued that permissions are determined substantively, not 
formally, even though the substantive metric is one generated within 
the criminal law rather than supplied extrinsically by the realm of 
morals. Additionally, I have maintained that the actual language that 
a given penal code employs may be probative, but not conclusive, 
evidence of the substantive norms that the legal regime aims to 
promulgate. Even if I am right, we may want a more concise principle, 
shortcut, or test for identifying what is substantively a permission (or, 
put another way, what are the true contours of the substantive norm) 
than I have yet supplied. Can we find one? 
Perhaps. After all, the basic distinction that the structural 
equivalence thesis draws between judgments of "not criminal" and 
"criminal but not punishable," would seem to map onto the familiar 
Benthamite distinction between rules addressed to the public 
commanding or prohibiting some behavior and rules directing judges 
what to do if the first sort of rule is violated. "Let no man steal," 
offered Bentham by way of illustration; "and, Let the judge cause 
whoever is convicted of stealing to be hanged."'59 In recent years, the 
distinction has been recovered and refined by Meir Dan-Cohen, who 
terms the first sort of rule a conduct rule and the second sort a 
decision rule.6 
The relevance of Dan-Cohen's conduct rule/decision rule 
distinction for the justification/excuse debate might seem obvious. 
Because justification defenses grant permissions, it would appear to 
follow that they are supposed to be understood by the public at large 
and, therefore, are within the conduct rules. In its core applications, 
for example, self-defense would seem both justificatory and a 
quintessential conduct rule: "You may cause the death of another 
much like asking what are a particular community's ubstantive norms of etiquette, subject to a 
couple of qualifications. First, the substantive norms of a criminal law regime are likely to be 
more deeply influenced by the society's moral judgments (without being reducible to them) 
than are the norms of etiquette. Second, an Anglo-American criminal theorist asking this sort of 
question about Anglo-American criminal law generally, or about a particular Anglo-American 
jurisdiction, is perhaps more likely to find her answer to the empirical question influenced by 
her own substantive moral views. 
59. JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 430 (Wilfred Harrison ed., 1948) (1789). 
60. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626-30 (1984) (demonstrating, against Bentham, Kelsen, 
and others, that the two sorts of rules cannot be collapsed into one another, i.e., that neither is a 
mere implication of the other). 
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human being if doing so is necessary to protect yourself from his 
imminent and unprovoked use of deadly force against you." Excuses 
don't grant permissions. They tell judges when persons who have 
acted without permission ought not to be punished. "Don't punish 
someone who is insane" would therefore seem like an excuse and a 
decision rule. In short, one might suppose that justifications simply 
are those defenses that fall within the system's conduct rules, while 
excuses are the defenses residing in the decision rules. 
I think this is precisely right. Indeed, the conceptual distinction 
between justification as a conduct rule and excuse as a decision rule- 
the first declaring that some conduct presumptively criminal is legally 
permissible, the second instructing judges not to punish offenders 
despite their conduct having been impermissible is so intuitively 
sensible that the greater question is not whether it's sound, but why it 
has not already been widely embraced.61 While a full answer is 
impossible here, the puzzle is sufficiently robust as to warrant 
something more than rhetorical treatment. 
A first step toward an answer may begin by looking closely at 
Dan-Cohen's notion of "acoustic separation." Imagine, he proposes, 
that the addressees of a system's conduct rules had no knowledge of 
the existence or application of its decision rules.62 Under a 
hypothetical regime of "acoustic separation" between the two sets of 
rules, individuals truly are guided only by the conduct rules,63 even if 
they might benefit from decision rules ex post for reasons 
(paradigmatically, but not exclusively) of fairness to the individual. In 
this regime, unlike in the real world, the awaiting decision rules could 
not influence the behavior of persons subjected only to the conduct 
61. One explanation can be quickly dispensed with. It might be objected that, even if this 
distinction is conceptually sound, the fact that acoustic separation is actually a fiction means that 
distinguishing justification defenses from excuse defenses cannot have practical significance. But 
this is no objection at all. Perhaps the distinction is not useful-a matter about which the present 
argument can remain agnostic. I claim only that there exists a conceptual distinction between 
the two, one that scholars have spilled a great deal of ink trying to articulate with precision. For 
skepticism regarding its practical utility, see Eric Colvin, Exculpatory Defenses in Criminal Law, 
10 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 381, 383-91 (1990), and Greenawalt, supra note 12. Cf Dan-Cohen, 
supra note 60, at 636-37 (purporting only to show "the logical independence of decision rules 
and conduct rules and the potential utility of this independence"). 
62. Dan-Cohen, supra note 60, at 630-34. 
63. Although conduct rules are sometimes described as "guiding" public conduct, this is 
potentially misleading for reasons John Gardner has pointed out. Very simply, "the law does 
not provide any reasons for one to do what the law holds to be justified." Gardner, supra note 
14, at 124. At least for purposes of the criminal law, therefore, conduct rules should be 
understood merely as specifying the circumstances under which conduct is, or is not, criminal. 
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rules. Not surprisingly, Dan-Cohen offers the defense of duress64 as 
exhibit A of a decision rule: 
[I]n the imaginary world of acoustic separation.... it becomes 
obvious that the policies advanced by the defense would lead to its 
use as a decision rule--an instruction to the judge that defendants 
who under duress committed acts that would otherwise amount to 
offenses should not be punished. Just as obviously, no comparable 
rule would be included among the conduct rules of the system: 
knowledge of the existence of the defense of duress would not be 
permitted to shape individual conduct; conduct would be guided 
exclusively by the relevant criminal proscriptions.65 
Just so. It is the smallest of steps to generalize from this 
discussion of duress to the broader claim I suggested earlier-namely, 
that the distinction between justification defenses (exemplified by 
necessity) and excuse defenses (exemplified by duress) just is the 
distinction between those defenses that reside among the conduct 
rules and those that are part of the decision rules. 
Importantly, though, Dan-Cohen himself does not draw this 
conclusion. Instead, when addressing the supposition that "the 
necessity norm would be included not only among the imaginary legal 
system's decision rules, but also among its conduct rules," he 
concludes that "this would not necessarily be so."66 "[W]hen the 
source of the necessity is the actor's self-interest," he explains, "[t]he 
prospect of a defense to a future criminal charge is likely to enhance 
the tendency to exaggerate the sense of necessity of protecting one's 
own interests."'67 So it may be more prudent not to let persons facing 
exigencies know that a necessity defense will be available. "At least in 
some cases, the test of necessity should be the actor's willingness to 
face, as an alternative to the ill consequences of abiding by the law, 
the threat of criminal punishment unmitigated by the prospect of 
64. I emphasize, especially for the benefit of British lawyers, that "duress" for Dan-Cohen 
apparently refers to action undertaken in the face of threats, but not amounting to the choice of 
a lesser evil. So, for instance, if B robs a store in response to A's threat to kill him, B's defense is 
necessity, not duress. (Technically, under the Model Penal Code, B would have both defenses. 
See MODEL PENAL CODE 9 2.09(4) (1962) (specifying that a duress defense is not precluded 
solely because the conduct would also be justifiable). Still, to understand Dan-Cohen's point, 
one should focus on that subcategory of duress that does not also constitute necessity.) See also 
supra note 9. 
65. Dan-Cohen, supra note 60, at 633; see also id. at 632-34. 
66. Id. at 638. 
67. Id. 
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legal reprieve."68 Some types of necessity defenses, therefore, should 
be known only to the ex post decisionmakers; they are better thought 
of as decision rules. 
Dan-Cohen is right in this sense: necessity (or some subset 
thereof) might well be a decision rule in a hypothetical world of 
acoustic separation. But that is not quite the same as establishing that 
necessity is a decision rule in our real world of acoustic integration. 
Imagine a prisoner who escapes to avoid being raped and murdered 
by his cellmate. After securing a lawyer, he surrenders to authorities, 
is charged with the felony of escaping from prison, and pleads 
necessity in defense. If the jurisdiction recognizes the defense of 
necessity when a defendant chose the lesser evil, and if it does not 
disallow the defense in escape cases, the prisoner should probably be 
exculpated. And according to Dan-Cohen, the defense falls within the 
decision rules. We don't want to punish this particular escapee 
because he did what the norms embodied in, and realized by, this 
criminal law regime consider the right thing to have done. At the 
same time, though, we don't want other prisoners to know about his 
exculpation because those in truly dire straits will try to escape no 
matter what they believe the conduct rules provide, and because 
publicizing the defense would risk encouraging prisoners to escape 
even absent true necessity. 
Of course, this analysis establishes at the same time that the 
defense is a justification in the sense advocated by the structural 
equivalence thesis: the substantive norms of the system do in fact 
permit this particular prisoner to act as he did even if he didn't know 
it. To put it another way, the prisoner who escapes under conditions 
of true necessity simply does not violate any substantive norm of the 
criminal law regime. It would not be appropriate to criticize him. One 
can permit something, after all, even without announcing that one 
permits it. Perhaps, we may even say, "permitting" is not the same as 
"giving permission." Thus, under Dan-Cohen's hypothetical regime 
of acoustic separation, authorities who announced in the conduct 
rules that necessity is no defense to prison escape, but who then 
placed precisely such a defense within the decision rules, would be 
doing something different than concealing merely an exemption from 
punishment for the violation of a norm. They would be strategically 
concealing a true permission. That is, the defense that they have 
68. Id. 
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hidden within the decision rules would remain, conceptually, 
a justification. 
In short, although Dan-Cohen rejects the implication of the 
revised view that the justification/excuse distinction maps cleanly 
onto the distinction between conduct rules and decision rules, that is 
only because conduct rules and decision rules become subtly 
transformed by the acoustic separation gloss. Acoustic separation is 
designed to help distinguish conduct rules from decision rules. Yet 
the thought experiment it invites is not a sure guide. We don't really 
live in a world of acoustic separation. Dan-Cohen asks us to imagine 
that the conceptual distinction between conduct and decision rules 
are manifested in positive law. However because strategic 
considerations would then be afoot, some things that "really" are 
conduct rules-"really" in the sense of reflecting the actual 
substantive norms that the particular criminal law system takes itself 
to be embodying-would be placed within the decision rules-and 
perhaps vice versa.69 Put another way, the acoustic separation device 
partly bolsters our intuitive sense of what are conduct rules and what 
are decision rules, but partly distorts it as well. Justifications are those 
defenses that exist, conceptually, within the conduct rules, while 
excuses are those defenses that exist, conceptually, within the 
decision rules. It does not follow that this mapping would survive a 
transition to the hypothetical world of acoustic separation. The 
influence of Dan-Cohen's two-decades-old device might therefore 
help explain why the straightforward conceptualization of 
justifications as the conduct rule defenses and excuses as the decision 
69. Recall Peter Westen's hypothetical of a law that declares it permissible for a child 
under seven to engage in conduct that is made criminal for adults. See supra note 57 and 
accompanying text. I suggested that, even though we could imagine circumstances under which 
this defense qualifies the substantive norms, hence is a justification, this is probably best 
conceptualized as an excuse notwithstanding the somewhat infelicitous statutory language. If we 
choose to conceptualize the criminal laws as divided into conduct rules and decision rules, this 
would be a decision rule. And it would probably remain a decision rule even in a world of 
acoustic separation: precocious six-year-olds who read the penal code would learn that they 
must not kill, steal, or vandalize; only the judges would know not to punish the very young 
transgressor. 
Imagine, though, that these same six-year-olds read news reports of other children who 
commit crimes and are prosecuted. As a consequence, they experience withering anxiety that 
they too will be prosecuted-not because they anticipate committing crimes, but only because 
they fear being apprehended on cases of mistaken identity. If confronted by a nation of 
depressed kindergartners, the authorities could be moved to alleviate the children's fears by 
publishing the infancy defense among the regime's conduct rules. I submit that the defense 
would nonetheless remain both an excuse and, conceptually speaking, a decision rule. 
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rule defenses is so rarely appreciated today. Indeed, even George 
Fletcher, the dean of justification and excuse scholars,"7 has explicitly 
identified justification as a decision rule, not a conduct rule.7' 
3. Summary. The structural equivalence thesis holds that a 
justification in the criminal law is simply an exception to, or 
permission grafted upon, a criminal offense; an excuse defense 
obtains when a defendant is exempted from punishment for 
committing a criminal offense. This is not to say that whether a given 
defense is a justification or an excuse depends solely on how the 
governing statute happens to classify the defense, or whether a 
defense is drafted with magic words like "permitted to ... ." or "shall 
not be punished if... ." To the contrary, whether a given defense is a 
justification depends upon substantive judgments about the precise 
70. By my count, Fletcher has addressed the subject on at least eighteen occasions. E.g., 
BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 56, at 74-170; BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL 
THOUGHT 104-08 (1996); A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON 
TRIAL (1988); RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, at 759-875; Dogmas of the Model 
Penal Code, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 12-24 (1998); Domination in the Theory of Justification 
and Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 553 (1996); Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 537, 556-64 (1972); The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1269 
(1974); Mistake in the Model Penal Code: A False False Problem, 19 RUTG. L.J. 649, 656-70 
(1988); The Nature and Function of Criminal Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 687, 697, 701-02 (2000); 
The Nature of Justification, supra note 56, at 175; Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A 
Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory, 8 ISR. L. REV. 367 (1973); The Right and the 
Reasonable, supra note 3; The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason, supra note 1; The Right to Life, 
13 GA. L. REV. 1371, 1376-94 (1979); Rights and Excuses, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer-Fall 
1984, at 17; Should Intolerable Prison Conditions Generate a Justification or an Excuse for 
Escape?, 26 UCLA L. REV. 1355 (1979); The Unmet Challenge of Criminal Theory, 33 WAYNE 
L. REV. 1439 (1987). 
71. Fletcher, The Nature of Justification, supra note 56, at 180. Strikingly, he had asserted 
nearly a decade earlier that "the criteria of justification are supposed to function not only ex 
post as decision rules, but ex ante as conduct rules." Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 
supra note 3, at 976. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that he should concede that his more 
recent characterization of justification as a decision rule "is by no means obvious." Fletcher, The 
Nature ofJustification, supra note 56, at 180 n.8. Unfortunately, the explanation he gives for the 
uncertainty is confusing. "Claims of justification do enter into debates between individuals 
about whether their conduct is right or wrong," Fletcher acknowledges. Id. "The question is 
whether it is the legislative language as such, or rather the general principles of justification, that 
enter into these debates." Id. But what makes this "the question" is unclear. If he means that 
legislative language is not dispositive of whether a defense is a justification, I agree. But this 
point is not sufficient to drive justifications out of the realm of conduct rules. See also Shute et 
al., supra note 53, at 12-13 (intimating that justifications are better viewed as conduct rules); 
Colvin, supra note 61, at 385 ("A defence of justification modifies the rules of conduct to which 
it applies.... A defence of excuse, on the other hand, supposedly leaves the prohibitory 
rule intact."). 
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contours of the norms that the criminal regime can best be 
understood to promulgate. 
Another way to capture this point is that a justification exists 
within the conduct rules, while an excuse exists within the decision 
rules. Unfortunately, this way of putting things provides little 
guidance in determining whether any given defense is a justification 
or an excuse. For one thing, no real Anglo-American penal codes are 
explicitly divided into conduct rules and decision rules. Furthermore, 
even if they were, we would still be confronted by the problem that 
the precise form of a penal code is an unreliable indication of its true 
substantive normativity. Persons who are frustrated by the rejection 
of the formalist solution to the problem of distinguishing justifications 
from excuses might be drawn to Dan-Cohen's acoustic-separation 
thought experiment, seeing in it a somewhat more mechanical way 
than otherwise seems to exist for determining which defenses fall 
within the regime's conduct rules, hence are justifications, and which 
fall within the decision rules, hence are excuses. Acoustic separation 
is in many ways an illuminating device. But it can be misleading: some 
defenses that a crafty legislature might place within the decision rules 
under such a hypothetical regime might nonetheless really be 
justifications, and some defenses placed within the conduct rules 
might really be excuses. 
III. THE SUBJECTIVE/OBJECTIVE DEBATE 
I have argued that the roles that justifications and excuses play in 
the criminal law are structurally equivalent, but not substantively 
equivalent, to the roles they play in moral reasoning. But I have also 
argued that the metric for determining whether a given criminal law 
defense is one of justification or of excuse is substantive, not formal. 
That is, the precise language of the penal code is only evidence of 
how a given defense is best classified. It is possible that a defense 
denominated as a permission could be more sensibly understood as 
an excuse, and vice versa. Lastly, I argued that Dan-Cohen's thought 
experiment-how the statutes would be crafted in a hypothetical 
regime of acoustic separation-is not a sure guide for distinguishing 
justifications from excuses. If all this is correct, we are left with the 
view that identifying the precise contours of a given criminal law 
norm-that is, determining whether a given defense qualifies the 
norm or excepts the offender from punishment for violating the 
norm-•is a contestable matter of sociological jurisprudence. 
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A major challenge to this view is presented in the literature 
addressing whether justifications are "subjective" or "objective." 
Partisans to this debate argue that at least some general 
jurisprudential things can be said about justifications and excuses- 
claims that are true by virtue of the nature of justifications and 
excuses as concepts relevant to the criminal law and do not depend 
upon the substantive normativity of a particular criminal law regime. 
Roughly, the subjectivists argue that an actor who believes that 
circumstances exist which would confer a justification is legally 
justified (at least if the belief is reasonable, and perhaps even if not), 
whereas one who acts in ignorance of potentially justificatory 
circumstances that do exist is fully inculpated. Objectivists, in 
contrast, contend that the actor who mistakenly believes his conduct 
justified is, at most, excused, and that one who commits an offense 
unaware of circumstances sufficient to confer a justification is at least 
partially exculpated. As a trans-jurisdictional matter, that is, 
justifications just are objective or just are subjective. 
I believe that both of these views are mistaken. This Part argues 
that conceiving of a criminal justification defense as meaning only 
that the conduct was not criminal, and an excuse defense as meaning 
that the conduct was criminal but the actor is not punishable, entails 
no necessary position on the question of whether justifications should 
be objective or subjective. Section A develops this claim in the 
context of "mistaken justifications." Section B addresses the converse 
situation, "unknowing justifications." 
A. Mistaken Justification 
Suppose that Agnes employs force against Barnaby, erroneously 
but reasonably believing that such use of force is necessary to protect 
herself, or some third party Clive, from Barnaby's imminent exercise 
of unlawful force. Apparently all commentators agree that Agnes 
should be exculpated if subsequently prosecuted for assault or 
homicide. (This, of course, is a moral claim about the shape that a just 
criminal law ought to take.) On a subjective (or "reasons") theory, 
Agnes has a justification, but not on an objective ("deeds") theory.72 
Because her use of force was not "objectively" the right thing to have 
72. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between 
subjective and reasons theories on the one hand, and between objective and deeds theories on 
the other). 
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done, the deeds theory of justification leaves Agnes only with 
an excuse. 
Now, it is apparent that criminal defenses could be drafted so as 
nominally to comply with either the subjective or the objective vision. 
That is, the criminal law could provide on its face that persons are 
permitted to use force in self-defense or defense of others either (a) 
when they believe that it's necessary, or (b) when, from a God's-eye 
perspective, it actually is necessary.73 Of course, given my earlier 
rejection of the purely formalist approach to divining what is or is not 
a true exception to a criminal prohibition,74 the fact that a permission 
could be couched in either subjective or objective terms is not 
conclusive with respect to the question of whether the form is faithful 
to the reality. Still, the possibility that the nominal norm does indeed 
reflect the substantive norm should not be dismissed out of hand. If 
we can imagine a legislature drafting a permission in either subjective 
or objective terms, we can also imagine the legislators defending that 
choice on substantive grounds. Accordingly, the argumentative 
burden fairly falls on one who would insist that, whatever form a 
given statutory regime might take, a justification, rightly understood, 
just is subjective or just is objective. This Section argues that the 
burden has not been met. 
1. Arguments from Logic. One approach in the literature has 
been to argue that we are compelled to conceptualize justifications 
either as objective or as subjective to avoid the unacceptable 
consequences of either a reductio ad absurdum or a logical 
contradiction. 
a. The objectivist reductio ad absurdum. The reductio favored 
by objectivists is simple to state. In fairly unusual (though by no 
means extraordinary) circumstances, they have sometimes argued the 
reasons theory fails to allow any defense (whether of justification or 
excuse) for persons who, according to our intuitions, should be 
73. These are not the only choices. Conceivably, a justification defense could lie when 
either condition is satisfied, or only if both are. Furthermore, the law could distinguish between 
actual unreasonable beliefs and actual reasonable beliefs. For instance, the law could be drafted 
along these lines: You may use force in self-defense to the extent you believe necessary.., but 
only if you have taken all reasonable steps under the circumstances to ascertain the need. Or, a 
reasons approach could mitigate punishment for actors who make unreasonable mistakes about 
the need to use force. 
74. See supra Part II.C.1. 
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exculpated.75 In the hypothetical above, recall, Agnes's belief in the 
need to use force against Barnaby is mistaken. Perhaps, say, Barnaby 
is actually an actor in a play, or the knife he appears to be wielding is 
actually a corn dog. Unfortunately, let us suppose, Barnaby can avoid 
injury or death at Agnes's hands only by using preemptive force 
against her. If he does so, does he have a defense? Presumably most 
people think so (at least where Barnaby was not negligent in inducing 
Agnes's false belief in the first place). And it's easy enough to reach 
that conclusion under the objective theory of justification: Barnaby is 
objectively justified in defending himself against Agnes's unlawful 
(albeit excused) use of force. But, the argument continues, he is not 
justified on a subjective theory. Therefore, unless we are to deny 
Barnaby any defense at all, we are logically compelled to define 
justification objectively. 
To address this argument, we must first understand precisely why 
Barnaby is supposed to lack a valid defense if, as the subjectivists 
would have it, Agnes herself has a defense of justification. The 
argument starts by identifying the candidate defenses-self-defense, 
duress, and necessity-and proceeds by process of elimination. Self- 
defense and duress are unavailable, it is said, because (among other 
things)76 they apply only in response to "unlawful force,"77 and force is 
lawful if justified. Necessity is said to be unavailable on the grounds 
that it is logically impossible for two actors each to be "justified" in 
assaulting the other,78 and, furthermore, because Barnaby would not 
75. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 14, at 51-54 (arguing that the reasons theory does not 
protect third parties who forcibly prevent an actor from using force against another in a 
reasonable but mistaken belief in that actor's right to self-defense). 
76. It might be added that under the common law, and in many contemporary statutory 
formulations, the duress defense is unavailable in homicide cases. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
CRIMINAL AW ? 5.3(b), at 468-69 & nn.12-13 (3d ed. 2000) (citing authorities). Of course, this 
is purely contingent. 
77. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE ? 3.04(1) (1962) (providing that "the use of force upon 
or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately 
necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other 
person on the present occasion"); id. ? 2.09(1) (extending a defense if "the actor engaged in the 
conduct charged..,. because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful 
force against his person or the person of another, that a person of reasonable firmness in his 
situation would have been unable to resist"). 
78. E.g., Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, supra note 3, at 975 (claiming "that in any 
situation of physical conflict, where only one party can prevail, logic prohibits us from 
recognizing that more than one of the parties could be justified in using force"). 
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be avoiding the "greater" evil in, say, killing Agnes to save his 
own life.79 
But none of this is convincing. As many commentators have 
noted, the "incompatibility thesis"-i.e., the claim that mutually 
contending parties cannot each be legally justified-is without logical 
support.? Whatever may be the case in morals,8 it is not 
"paradoxical"82 for two parties each to be legally justified in using 
force against the other if, as I have argued, legal justification means 
only legal permission. And all the other arguments are solely appeals 
to contingent positive law, not at all in the nature of logical or 
necessary truths. Take the legal defense that a non-lawyer is most 
likely to think apt for Barnaby-self-defense. There is not the 
slightest reason to take as a given that it cannot lie in response to 
justified force. To the contrary, subjectivists, who would treat Agnes 
as legally justified if prosecuted for the killing of Barnaby, could 
easily draft a statute that would exculpate Barnaby if he beat her to 
the punch. Indeed, such a statute could be drafted so as to suggest 
that Barnaby is himself legally justified, not merely excused, as 
follows: An actor may use force (including deadly force) when he 
believes it necessary to protect himself or another either from 
unlawful force or from lawful force that the actor believes would be 
unlawful were it not for a mistake on the part of the person against 
whom the actor employs force.83 This is essentially (but not precisely) 
79. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE ? 3.02(1)(a) ("Conduct that the actor believes to be 
necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that.., the 
harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by 
the law defining the offense charged ...."). 
80. E.g., Dressier, supra note 12, at 87-91; Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 1921-25; David 
Dolinko, Note, Intolerable Conditions as a Defense to Prison Escapes, 26 UCLA L. REV. 1126, 
1177-81 (1979). 
81. For one detailed argument that valid moral justifcations cannot oppose one another in 
this way, see HEIDI M. HURD, MORAL COMBAT (1999). 
82. See Jeremy Waldron, Self-Defense: Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Accounts, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 711, 726 (2000) (contending that "the paradox exists so long as the exculpation is 
thought of in terms of justification"). 
83. The Model Penal Code-which drafts justification defenses in terms of the actor's 
actual and reasonable beliefs, see generally MODEL PENAL CODE art. 3-tries to reach this same 
result. But the fact that it does so through a more cumbersome and even unclear methodology 
has fooled Robinson into concluding that the MPC "concedes the primary tenet of the 'deeds' 
theory of justification: that the nature of the deed must be taken as determinative, no matter 
what the actor's reasons for the deed." Robinson, supra note 14, at 54. This is doubly mistaken. 
First, no matter what the MPC's approach, the provision proposed in the text demonstrates that 
a legislature could reach the (presumptively) substantively correct result in cases of this sort 
without taking the nature of the deed, independent of the actor's beliefs, to be determinative. 
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the approach taken by the Model Penal Code.84 Such a defense-call 
it "Justification,"-1is still "subjective" through and through. 
Second, as it happens, the MPC's approach does not take the nature of the deed as 
determinative. To the contrary, it adopts essentially the same solution as just suggested in the 
text. See infra note 84. 
84. In reaching his conclusion that the MPC resorts to a deeds theory to exculpate those 
who employ force against persons who act under conditions of mistaken justification, Robinson 
considers the following hypothetical: A is about to assault B under the mistaken belief that it is 
necessary in self-defense. Aware that A is mistaken, C assaults A just in time to prevent him 
from harming B. Under a subjective theory, A's use of force is justified, hence presumably 
"lawful," seeming to bar C's use of force against him. According to Robinson, the MPC avoids 
this plainly improper outcome through a three-step process. First, the MPC provides that C "is 
not justified in interfering to defend [B] unless [B] would be justified in using the same force in 
defence of himself." Id. at 52 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE ? 3.05(1)). Second, B's use of self- 
defense is justified only against "unlawful force." Id. at 52-53 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE ? 
3.04(1)). Third, subjectively justified force is "unlawful" if it is not "privileged"-a term that the 
MPC does not define but which the commentary suggests "is borrowed from tort law and is 
intended to mean objectively justified." Id. at 53 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE ? 3.11(1) & cmt. 
1, at 159 (1985)). In Robinson's view, this third step is the key: the MPC is compelled to employ 
the concept of objective justification to yield the intuitively proper result that C has a valid 
defense. "This practice of the Model Penal Code of defining 'unlawful force' that lawfully may 
be resisted as 'privileged force,'" Robinson concludes, "makes it difficult to describe that Code 
and the many like it as adopting a 'reasons' theory, as they first appeared to do." Id. at 54. 
I don't think so. The first problem with Robinson's analysis is that he misreads the MPC. 
Step one under the MPC approach actually directs that C's use of force "is justifiable to protect 
a third person [here, B] when.., under the circumstances as the actor [C] believes them to be, 
the person whom he seeks to protect would be justified in using such protective force." MODEL 
PENAL CODE ? 3.05(1)(b) (emphasis added). (To be more precise, and to accommodate 
situations in which C believes both that B is imperiled and that B is unaware of that peril, the 
Code should have added: "... were that person aware of the circumstances that the actor 
believes to obtain." But that slight oversight is not directly relevant to the instant hypothetical 
and can be safely ignored.) This has important consequences. To see that, consider these four 
possibilities: (1) A mistakenly believes that B is an aggressor, and C correctly believes that B is 
not; (2) A and C both mistakenly believe that B is an aggressor; (3) A correctly believes that B is 
not an aggressor, while C mistakenly believes that he is; and (4) A and C both correctly believe 
that B is not an aggressor. Were C prosecuted for assault under the MPC, in each of these four 
cases it will be C's beliefs that are determinative of his criminal liability: he has a valid 
justificatory defense in those cases and only in those cases where he believes that B is not an 
aggressor-i.e., cases (1) and (4), but not (2) or (3). One might disagree with any of these 
outcomes as a matter of policy. But the descriptive claim that, under the MPC, objective facts, 
not subjective beliefs are determinative, is false. A defendant's actual beliefs, not objective facts, 
determine outcomes under the MPC, though such beliefs must be reasonable to afford complete 
exculpation. See id. ? 3.09(2) (making the defense unavailable in prosecutions for offenses for 
which liability is predicated on negligence or recklessness if the actor negligently or recklessly 
believed in his right to use self-defense). 
In light of all this, how could Robinson conclude that the MPC's "approach to mistake as 
to a justification ought to be termed one of only a 'reasons' terminology rather than a 'reasons' 
theory'"? Robinson, supra note 14, at 54. To answer this question, a slight digression will be 
required. Notice that the last sentence of the preceding paragraph refers to a defendant's actual 
beliefs; it does not say "actual beliefs," full stop. There's a reason for that. Let's be clear about 
what a subjective or reasons theory is a theory about. It's a theory about the circumstances that 
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Not surprisingly, the literature contains more fanciful 
hypotheticals. Consider this from Jeremy Waldron: 
A fanatical terrorist..,. has killed a number of people and is now 
holed up in a building surrounded by police.... 
Unfortunately, the terrorist has a hostage, and he is determined to 
move out of the house using the hostage as a human shield. He 
knows that there is a good chance that the police will try to kill him 
even if this means shooting through the body of the innocent 
hostage. Devilishly, he explains the situation to the hostage and 
convinces him that either they will both escape together or they will 
both die together. He gives the hostage a pistol with which he can 
shoot back at any police officers who may try to shoot (through) 
him, assuring him of course that if he even so much as makes a move 
matter when determining whether a criminal defendant has a valid justificatory defense. And 
the answer that the subjective or reasons theory provides is that justifications in the criminal aw 
depend upon the actual beliefs or reasons of the actor claiming the defense. A subjective or 
reasons theory is not committed to the view that all facts made relevant in criminal prosecutions 
must be assessed from the subjective viewpoint of some party to the relevant events as opposed 
to the (more) objective viewpoint of the factfinder. To see what I mean consider a very different 
example. Like many penal codes, the MPC makes it a felony for a male to have consensual 
sexual intercourse with a female under sixteen if the male is at least four years her senior. 
MODEL PENAL CODE ? 213.3(1)(a). Suppose that the defendant, a nineteen-year-old male, has 
consensual sex with a girl he knows to be fifteen. Nobody would think that the MPC's subjective 
approach to justifications would commit it to exculpate the defendant if the girl believed that he 
was eighteen. Consideration of the beliefs of persons other than the defendant himself is not 
what is entailed by a subjective theory of justification. 
I emphasize this because Robinson is surely right that, under MPC ? 3.11(1), the 
defendant's beliefs that matter are beliefs about what might be called objective justification. If C 
believes (correctly) that A is acting on certain honest but mistaken beliefs that make him, A, 
subjectively justified but not objectively so, C has a valid defense in assaulting A. But Robinson 
is wrong in thinking that this particular reliance on objective facts is inconsistent with a 
subjective theory of justification. The only reason Robinson's argument on this point looks any 
more plausible than the obviously false contention advanced by our hypothetical nineteen-year- 
old rape defendant (that the girl's mistake should win him exculpation) is because of the 
assumption that all theorists, subjectivist or objectivist, are necessarily committed to the claim 
that conduct is "not unlawful" if criminally justified. Yet this is false. It is arguably an analytic 
truth that conduct is "not criminal" if criminally justified. (But see the debate over the closure 
view of justifications, supra note 11.) But the law as a whole consists of various, discrete, 
normative systems. Much conduct not criminal is nonetheless unlawful. (So even though this 
Article sometimes treats "criminally justified" as equivalent to "legally justified," that is an 
imprecision tolerated for simplicity of exposition.) The point of MPC ? 3.11 is essentially to 
make clear that action that is criminally excused and even criminally justified may still be 
unlawful for purposes of being conduct that one might forcefully resist. I happen to think that 
the formulation proposed earlier, supra note 83 and accompanying text, conveys that point 
more felicitously than does the MPC, but there is no basis for denying that the MPC's theory of 
justification remains subjective. 
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to turn the pistol on his captor he (the terrorist) will kill him 
instantly.... 
[Thus arrayed, the terrorist and hostage start to leave the building 
and immediately encounter a police officer.] All three individuals 
grasp the situation in a flash, and all three begin firing: the terrorist 
and his hostage firing at the officer, the officer firing at and through 
the hostage. Each of them is shooting to kill. None of them is under 
any misapprehension of fact. 
Waldron takes for granted that the police officer would be justified, 
and that the terrorist would not. But what about the hostage? 
Supposing he knows that the officer is perfectly justified in firing at 
him,86 does he have a defense if he proves the quicker shot and is later 
brought up on charges of homicide or assault? 
Under Justification, proposed above, he is not justified. The 
officer's force is lawful, and the hostage cannot believe that its 
lawfulness depends upon any mistake of fact. I'm disposed to think 
that outcome sound, though it might remain sensible and just for the 
hostage to be adjudged excused. This result could be realized, for 
example, by extending the defense of duress to an actor who 
succumbs to pressures (not amounting to the use or threatened use of 
unlawful force) that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation 
could not have resisted.87 It hardly bears mention, I hope, that there is 
no inconsistency in concluding that the hostage should not be justified 
but should be exculpated on grounds of excuse. When the law accords 
the hostage an excuse, but not a justification, the state is purporting to 
command persons in such situations not to defend themselves. And 
although such a demand might appear only nominal in light of the 
awaiting excuse, in theory it could produce different outcomes in a 
world of committed rule-followers, which (in our actual world of 
acoustic integration) is at least some of the gist of the difference 
between conduct rules and decision rules. 
85. Waldron, supra note 82, at 714 (adapting the hypothetical from one proposed in 
KADISH, supra note 8, at 122-23). 
86. To be more precise, you need suppose only that the hostage knows the facts that make 
out the officer's justification; it is not important that the hostage knows as well that, on those 
facts, the officer has a justification in law. 
87. Cf MODEL PENAL CODE ? 2.09(1) (providing the defense of duress to an actor who 
accedes to threats of unlawful force "which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation 
would have been unable to resist"). 
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But perhaps you disagree. You might agree that the hostage is 
not blameworthy and does not deserve the stigma of a criminal 
conviction. However if you anticipate that few hostages would be 
influenced by the criminal law in such circumstances, you might 
believe that even a merely ostensible command not to fire is foolish 
and risks bringing the criminal law into disrepute. For these reasons 
(or others) you might conclude that the law should grant the hostage 
a justification and not merely an excuse. Because (as we have just 
seen) Justification, does not grant the hostage a justification defense, 
you might conclude further that a subjective approach to justifications 
(which Justification, exemplifies) commits one to an unduly 
restrictive conception of justification. This would be a mistake. Even 
if Justification, does not cover the hostage, there is no reason why it 
could not be supplemented. For example, the legislature could 
provide-codified, say, as "Justification2"-that an actor is justified in 
using force in self-defense when he is the non-aggressor and believes 
it necessary to protect himself against another's use of force. 
So it does not appear that Justification, commits the subjectivist 
to an unduly restrictive permission for self-defense. But does it 
commit her to an overly generous formulation? Suppose that 
Constable is on his way to arrest Outlaw, who is known to be armed 
and dangerous. Doppelganger, an innocent man who just happens to 
be a dead ringer for Outlaw, sees Constable coming. Because Outlaw 
has killed other officers attempting arrest, Constable is lawfully 
authorized to subdue Outlaw by, say, firing a painful, but not lethal, 
electric stun gun. Doppelganger has been listening in on a police 
radio, and he understands the situation perfectly. Unfortunately, 
because his jaw happens to be wired shut, he can't communicate his 
innocence to Constable. Can he shoot Constable with his own stun 
gun to avoid being stunned himself?88 Justification, would provide 
Doppelganger with a defense. Although Constable's force might be 
lawful, Doppelganger believes (correctly, in fact) that it would be 
unlawful but for Constable's mistake regarding Doppelganger's 
identity. But such an outcome is not at all compelled. If the legislature 
thinks this bad policy, it could amend Justification, to specify, say, 
that the use of force in self-protection "is not justifiable..,. to resist 
an arrest that the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, 
88. This hypothetical is adapted from one supplied in SMITH, supra note 37, at 20-21. I 
have altered it to make clear that Doppelganger is not threatened with deadly force. 
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although the arrest is unlawful."89 Call this amended version of 
Justification1, "Justification3." 
The point of this lengthy exploration into hypothetical subjective 
justification defenses is simple. Complex cases like these raise issues 
of policy to be addressed by careful legislative drafting, not issues of 
conceptual understanding." 
b. The subjectivist logical contradiction. Although it is generally 
the objectivists who have urged that we are somehow compelled to 
accept one particular conceptualization of justifications, Russell 
Christopher has argued in a clever and original paper that objective 
theories of justification lead to logical contradiction.91 In brief, 
Christopher argues that when A, B, and C are shooting at one 
another "around in a circle"-A at B, B at C, C at A---each unaware 
that his intended victim is threatening the third person (who in turn 
threatens the actor himself), Paul Robinson's objective approach is 
internally contradictory. As Christopher explains: 
If C's threat is unjustified, then B's threat is justified in defense of A. 
Therefore, A's threat is unjustified in defense of C. Consequently, 
C's threat is justified in defense of B. But if C's threat is justified, B's 
threat is unjustified. Therefore, A's threat is justified. Consequently, 
C's threat is unjustified. The resulting contradiction is that if C's 
threat is unjustified, it is justified; but if C's threat is justified, it is 
unjustified. 
Although I am personally sympathetic to subjective articulations 
of the justification defense, I nonetheless think Christopher's 
argument is ultimately flawed. Whether any given actor has an 
objective justification reduces, on Robinson's account, to whether the 
net societal consequences would have been worse had he not acted as 
he did.93 Given this standard, it should be clear that none of the 
parties is justified if each shoots and kills his victim: The outcome 
would not have been worse (taking the circle as a closed system) had 
89. This is the Model Penal Code's solution. MODEL PENAL CODE ? 3.04(2)(a)(i). 
90. See Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 20 (arguing that legislative resolution of the 
subjective/objective debate-and all its possible variations-"requires delicate judgments about 
fairness and desirable criminal policy, not merely wooden conceptualization"). 
91. Russell L. Christopher, Self-Defense and Defense of Others, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 123 
(1998). 
92. Id. at 129-30. 
93. E.g., 2 ROBINSON, CRIMINAL AW DEFENSES, supra note 13, at 46. 
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any one of the three not fired.94 In contrast, all parties are justified if 
each actor's threat deters the next from firing, with the net result that 
nobody is harmed. Indeed, no contradiction need ensue even for the 
intermediate cases in which at least one, but not all, actors fire. For 
just one example, imagine that A shoots B in time to moderately 
injure B, sufficient to disable B from shooting C, and C shoots and 
grievously injures A. C is justified on a deeds approach if and only if, 
had he not shot A, (1) A would have reloaded and finished off B, and 
(2) the death of B is worse (on the deeds theorists' metric) than the 
sum of moderate injury to B plus grievous injury of A. A is justified if 
and only if, from a God's-eye perspective, had A not shot B, B would 
have shot and killed C, but not in time to have prevented C from 
shooting and injuring A. Evaluation depends upon counterfactual 
reasoning, of course. But an objective theory, like Robinson's, that 
does not rely upon notions of "moral forfeiture," does not seem to 
generate logical contradiction-at least so long as it does not also 
adhere to the "incompatibility thesis" discussed earlier."95 
2. On the Nature of Norms. There is a second way to rebut the 
implication of the structural equivalence thesis that criminal law 
justifications could be either subjective or objective, depending upon 
the values, needs, and goals of a particular criminal regime. That way 
is to establish that something about the nature of normative reasoning 
either requires or forbids that norms be sensitive to beliefs as against 
objective facts. Put otherwise, one could argue that the nature of 
normativity itself entails that justifications must be subjective or must 
be objective. 
Paul Robinson, one of most productive and creative criminal 
theorists of the day, is perhaps the chief proponent of this view, At 
first blush one might expect to count him among the scholars most 
receptive to the claims, first, that the distinction between justification 
and excuse just is the distinction between defenses that defeat 
94. I do recognize that the question of justification might be thought moot in this example, 
as each of the actors ends up dead. But if you don't mind entertaining the sometimes outlandish 
sorts of hypotheticals that are the staples of this literature, I suspect that you won't mind putting 
this complication aside. 
95. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. Robinson himself has expressly stated 
that he does not endorse the incompatibility thesis. See Paul H. Robinson, The Bomb Thief and 
the Theory of Justification Defenses, 8 CRIM. L.F. 387, 407 n.44 (1997) (rejecting the argument 
that two actors engaged in combat cannot both be justified). But see 1 ROBINSON, supra note 13, 
at 165 ("Where an aggressor has a justification defense, the proper rule is clear: justified 
aggression should never be lawfully subject to resistance or interference."). 
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criminality and those that concede criminality but defeat punishability 
and, second, that the significance of this distinction is captured by the 
distinction between conduct rules and decision rules. After all, the 
radical draft criminal code Robinson recently proposed is divided into 
a Code of Conduct and a Code of Adjudication,96 a framework nearly 
mirroring Dan-Cohen's distinction between Conduct Rules and 
Decision Rules-though without the "acoustic separation" device."7 
And Robinson takes pains to place justification defenses among the 
former, and excuse defenses among the latter."8 Moreover, he 
observed even a quarter century ago that, "[t]hough justification is 
often considered a 'defense', it is more properly viewed as an 
'element' of an offense in the sense that no crime can be said to have 
occurred if the act is justified or, in other words, unless the act was 
non-justified."99 Yet Robinson does not draw the lesson that any 
further exploration is either in the nature of policy prescription- 
arguments that for reasons of sound policy, efficiency, fairness, or 
what-have-you, the state should or should not criminalize certain 
sorts of conductm--or of sociology-efforts to determine whether 
particular defenses that already exist within a given criminal regime 
are best understood internally as exceptions to the prima facie norms 
or as exemptions from punishability. Instead, he seems to insist that, 
rightly understood, justifications just are objective.'0 
96. See ROBINSON, supra note 7, at 183-239. 
97. See id. at 207-09 (rejecting Dan-Cohen's acoustic separation system). Acoustic 
separation is discussed supra Section II.C.2. 
98. Part IV of his proposed Code of Conduct concerns "Justified Violations of the Criminal 
Law"; Article 22 of his Code of Adjudication addresses "Excuses." Id. at 218-20, 226-29. 
99. Robinson, supra note 1, at 273 n.32 (citation omitted). This is the type of comment that 
provokes Fletcher's concerns about "flat" reasoning. See supra note 71. But it needn't. Despite 
his perhaps unfortunate reference here to offense elements, I take Robinson to view non- 
justification as an element in a finding of a criminal violation, though presumably not to a 
finding of a criminal infringement. For the difference, see supra note 71. 
100. This remains true even where criminal law defenses are still in the hands of judges, not 
the legislature, with the caveat that judges might face additional institutional constraints on the 
types of considerations that they can properly take into account. 
101. At points, Robinson could be read as intimating that there exist several possible 
conceptualizations of justification, none of which is inherently more valid than the others, all of 
which can be argued for or against based on practical considerations. See, e.g., Robinson, supra 
note 14, at 62: 
It is possible to conceptualize current criminal law rules in any number of ways. 
Presumably, the preferred conceptualization is the one that best advances the reason 
for having a conceptual scheme, and that reason, I would argue, is to help us think 
most clearly about the issues and to give us the greatest insight into their proper 
formulation and application. 
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Robinson's insistence on a deeds theory of justifications stems 
most directly from his substantive view that offenses should be 
limited to non-mental components. Put another way, he believes that, 
with few and unusual exceptions that need not concern us here, the 
Code of Conduct should be crafted to exclude reference to 
intentional and cognitive states of the actor.'M And that view derives 
in turn from his bedrock belief that every verdict in a criminal case 
sends a moral message to the community, and therefore that the law 
See also id. at 48, 70 (presenting reasons to prefer the deeds theory). Under this view, he should 
be understood as arguing only that the objective theory is to be preferred as more useful, in 
better serving sound policy goals, including realizing the more just results, and more effectively 
educating the public. But this is not, I think, the fairer reading of his work. More often he seems 
to assert that the objective construction of justification does have a greater claim to truth, even 
in an ideal or nonpragmatic sense. This is reflected in his repeated assertion that the deeds 
theory better captures the relevant distinctions, see, e.g., id. at 48, 61--distinctions that, as far as 
I can tell, are thought to exist just in the nature of things. So, for example, Robinson criticizes 
the Model Penal Code's conceptual scheme as "odd and misleading" for treating "a mistaken 
belief in a justification" as justified, even though it "is identical in character to excuses." Id. at 
62. That is, he explains, "[1]abelling the mistake-as-to-a-justification defence an 'unprivileged 
justification' suggests that it is conceptually similar to the defences of the 'privileged 
justification' group, yet in fact it is conceptually analogous to-indeed, more than that, it is 
conceptually indistinguishable from-the defences of the excuses group." Id. (emphases 
omitted; emphasis added). But, of course, whether mistaken justification is "identical in 
character to excuses,"-i.e., whether they are "conceptually indistinguishable"-is precisely the 
matter over which he and his opponents disagree. In light of these potentially conflicting strands 
in Robinson's characterization of the nature of the justification/excuse distinction, his recent 
and intriguing work with Princeton social psychologist John Darley might signal an increasing 
willingness to de-naturalize his preferred conceptualization. See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON & 
JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME (1995) (comparing societal views on the 
principles of criminal aw with the actual provisions in legal code). 
Having thus charged Robinson with sending some conflicting signals on this issue, it is 
only fair that I make clear that I am myself coherentist or pragmatist regarding the truth status 
of the particular conceptualization between justification and excuse for which I have been 
arguing. As Grant Lamond has usefully put it, conceptual arguments are properly measured by 
how convincing and illuminating an account they provide in each case-whether what 
they deliver is still recognizable as an account of the phenomenon in question, how 
well it succeeds in systematically linking the phenomenon to related aspects of our 
understanding, and whether it deepens our comprehension of the phenomenon. 
Grant Lamond, The Coerciveness of Law, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 47 (2000). In saying 
this, I do not mean to enter into the debate lately raging among legal philosophers regarding 
whether conceptual analysis of law depends upon substantive moral evaluation. See generally 
JULIE DICKSON, EVALUATION AND LEGAL THEORY (2001) (summarizing the debate and 
advocating analysis of the law "as is" before direct moral evaluation). It seems to me that not 
even an affirmative answer to that question would entail that we need recourse to more than the 
epistemic values of simplicity, coherence, clarity, and the like, in order to evaluate competing 
accounts of the concepts that law employs. 
102. See ROBINSON, supra note 7, at 129-37, 185-86 (proposing to eliminate culpability 
requirements from the definitions of most offenses). 
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should be structured so as to make that message as clear and accurate 
as possible.'03 
To this end, Robinson envisions five distinct jury verdicts in an 
ideal system of criminal law: (1) not guilty because no violation; (2) 
not guilty because justified violation; (3) not guilty by blameless 
violation; (4) not punishable; and (5) guilty.'" No violation exists 
when the state has not proven the objective/external elements of the 
offense-for example, that the defendant assaulted another person, 
or was in possession of cocaine, or committed an unlawful entry. A 
justified violation occurs when the defendant has committed the 
objective elements of an offense, but satisfies conditions of objective 
justification. An unjustified violation is blameless when any one of a 
number of conditions are present-that the defendant lacked 
culpability because of a reasonable mistake of fact, or committed the 
offense involuntarily (as by convulsion or sleepwalking), or acted 
under duress or when insane.'?5 A blameworthy violation is 
nonetheless "not punishable" when nonexculpatory defenses like the 
statute of limitations or diplomatic immunity apply. In all other cases, 
the defendant is guilty. 
Focus on the distinctions among the first three verdicts.16 
Bracketing any doubts about the value of differentiating between "no 
103. See, e.g., id. at 204-05 (discussing the need to distinguish "no violation" acquittals from 
"blameless violation" and "justified violation" acquittals). 
104. Id. app. B ?? 410-14. 
105. Curiously, the verdict forms don't distinguish among these, but the language of the 
Code of Adjudication does. When the defendant is not at least reckless as to each element of 
the violation (or, in some few situations, negligent), his "violation" is deemed "not criminal." Id. 
app. B ? 200(1). When the defendant had the requisite culpability but can claim, for instance, 
insanity, duress, or involuntariness, his "violation" is "excused." Id. app. B ?? 220-28. Robinson 
does not explain why the distinction between "not criminal" and "excused"-which seemingly 
carries some normative flavor-is not reflected in the available verdicts, although he does note 
that "there seems little benefit" in requiring the jury to specify the particular ground of 
excuse-involuntariness, duress, mistake as to justification, etc.-because it would "require[] 
that the jurors come to agreement on the ground of exculpation." Id. at 146 n.3. 
106. This is not to suggest that the fourth verdict-"not punishable"-is wholly 
unproblematic. Although it has obvious merit, it worrisomely risks implying that the defendant 
"really is" guilty but for the presence of some lawyerly type defense. (Tellingly, when Robinson 
first introduces this possible verdict, he proposes to call it "guilty but not punishable." Id. at 73. 
Although it has morphed into the sparer "not punishable" by the time it is produced in 
Appendix B, see id. app. B ? 413, the transformation is never explained.) And that might not be 
a fair inference. The ban against double jeopardy, for instance, rests partly on the judgment that 
individuals should be spared the trouble and hazard of defending themselves from subsequent 
criminal prosecutions, as Robinson himself recognizes. See Robinson, supra note 8, at 232 n.124. 
But an "actually innocent" defendant who could avail himself of such a defense must be aware 
of the message that it would send. Cf ROBINSON, supra note 7, at 70 (describing "a logical 
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violation" and "justified violation,"'07 the most critical line is plainly 
drawn between verdicts 1 and 2 on the one hand, and verdict 3 on the 
other. Something of importance-presumably some distinct 
normative message-turns upon the distinction between finding that 
the defendant (a) committed no unjustified violation, or (b) is 
blameless for committing an unjustified violation. Now, I am skeptical 
that it makes sense even to try to use the criminal law to make such 
fine-tuned moral judgments. To elaborate on a question raised by 
Kent Greenawalt, what should a jury do when all jurors agree that the 
defendant is not guilty-i.e., should be acquitted-but differ among 
themselves regarding whether there was no violation, or a justified 
violation, or a noncriminal violation, or an excused violation?108 
Robinson offers no response.109 
hierarchy" among justification, excuse, and nonexculpatory defenses). The "not punishable" 
verdict therefore pressures him to submit to all the evils that the defense is designed to protect 
him from. It is no answer that, even under existing systems, a defendant who pleads and prevails 
upon a nonexculpatory defense takes the same risks. A basic premise underlying Robinson's 
enterprise is that the existing system does not send such messages clearly enough. See supra note 
103 and accompanying text. 
107. Robinson does not explain precisely what evaluative coloration this distinction is 
intended to capture. By intimating that there exists some normative difference between the two, 
however, he seems to ally himself with the minority view that a justification qualifies 
wrongfulness without negating it. See supra note 11. 
108. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 1900-01 (observing that, except in cases of 
acquittal on the basis of mental disease, juries are generally not obliged to explain the grounds 
for acquittal, and arguing that introducing such a practice would confront substantial obstacles); 
Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 17-18 (same). 
109. In an argument that deserves to be quoted at length, Robinson exploits precisely this 
problem in an effort to tarnish the subjective approach to justification. Under the Model Penal 
Code, Robinson explains: 
An actor's conduct is 'justifiable' if it is within the rules of conduct ('privileged') or if 
it violates the rules of conduct under the actual facts (unprivileged) but the actor 
mistakenly believes that it is justified. Because of this formulation of justification 
defences, a jury is never asked to determine whether the conduct is objectively 
proper. The jury need only determine whether the actor's conduct was either in fact 
proper, or improper but he believed that it was proper. (Note that the members of the 
jury need not even agree among themselves as to which of these two alternatives is 
true. Thus, even the members of the jury, then, may not be able to clarify an 
ambiguous acquittal.) The ultimate effect of this is that, even if a more refined verdict 
system were in place, the Code's subjective formulation of justification defences 
leaves it unclear whether a jury should select a no-violation or a blameless-violation 
verdict. 
ROBINSON, supra note 7, at 147-48 (footnote omitted). But Robinson does not seem to fully 
appreciate the force of his parenthetical note. When jurors disagree among themselves about 
underlying facts, the jury will always find it unclear which form of exculpatory verdict to select 
no matter how the justification defenses are formulated. Put otherwise, Robinson's assertion that, 
"[w]ith proper organization, a code of adjudication easily can" distinguish among these types of 
acquittals, id. at 204 (emphasis added), misses the point: the actual adjudications often can't. 
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Even supposing that such fine-tuning is possible and desirable, 
the content of the different categories is more than dubious. To start, 
as Jeremy Horder has cogently argued, it seems morally senseless to 
include involuntariness on the disfavored side of this divide."1 
Suppose Lisa is charged with having "cause[d] bodily injury.., to 
another person" (in violation of ? 3 of Robinson's Code of 
Conduct)."' If a jury determines that she did so only because forcibly 
(and maliciously) propelled by her older brother Bart, it is ridiculous 
for the legal system to seek to transmit a message that Lisa is entitled 
to anything less than top-drawer exculpation. 
Or, imagine matters before the incident. Picture the hypothetical 
public education classes of which Robinson is fond.112 Suppose the 
students are collectively reading the Code of Conduct, and precocious 
Lisa asks: What would happen if my brother Bart were to pick me up 
and throw me into Milhouse? Consistent with Robinson's vision, the 
teacher would have to answer that Lisa would be found to have 
violated the Criminal Code (tsk, tsk!), but (not to worry!) would be 
adjudged "blameless" for this violation. Wouldn't the children think 
that crazily unfair? And wouldn't they be right? If so, the upshot is 
not trivial. It reveals that Robinson's mapping of the Codes of 
Conduct and Adjudication onto the distinction between ex ante and 
ex post perspectives is too facile. Even from an ex ante perspective, 
citizens are imagining the ex post situation. And one fundamental 
question in which they'll be interested is this: Will I be found to have 
violated the criminal law or not?113 
If the above is true, then perhaps more than a requirement of 
voluntariness ought to be moved into the Code of Conduct. For the 
same is arguably true about culpability determinations. Again, Lisa 
might wonder: What if I cause structural damage to the school by 
110. See Jeremy Horder, Criminal Law and Legal Positivism, 8 LEGAL THEORY 221, 229 
(2002) (criticizing Robinson for placing involuntariness among the excuses "because only 
wrongdoing needs excuse, and the involuntariness of conduct actually undermines the 
wrongfulness... of conduct.... because what is wrong is something there is reason not to do, 
and involuntary conduct is not sensitive to the guiding influence of reason"). 
111. See ROBINSON, supra note 7, app. A ? 3 (Draft Code of Conduct, "Injury to a Person"). 
112. See, e.g., id. at 156 (advocating the promulgation of simple rules of conduct to be 
discussed in school children's "citizenship classes"). 
113. Cf CANE, supra note 10, at 93: 
[T]he criminal law is as much concerned with telling us what our responsibilities are 
as with deciding whether, in particular cases, we should be subject to sanctions for not 
performing those responsibilities. The law gives us goals to aim at, while at the same 
time offering reassurance that failure to meet those goals will not necessarily attract 
legal sanctions. 
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inadvertently carrying in an explosive device that Bart has secreted in 
my lunch box? And, again, the Robinsonian answer would be that 
Lisa will have violated the Code of Conduct,114 but will be adjudged 
"Not Guilty by Reason of Blameless Violation.""' Yet if, as Horder 
has argued, it is senseless to conceive of involuntary action as 
violating the Code of Conduct, the very same is arguably true of non- 
culpable voluntary conduct.1"6 If Lisa did not suspect-indeed (if it 
matters) where nobody would have suspected-that her lunch box 
contained a bomb, it may be thought normatively obtuse to saddle 
her with the relative stigma that must attach to anything less than the 
most robust form of exculpation the system makes available.l'7 Even if 
114. See ROBINSON, supra note 7, app. A ? 24 (Draft Code of Conduct, "Damage to or 
Theft of Property"). 
115. See id. app. B ? 220 (Draft Code of Conduct, "Disability Excuse: Involuntary 
Conduct"); id. app. B ? 412 (Draft Code of Adjudication, "Verdict Form: Blameless 
Violation"). 
116. I leave open whether non-reckless conduct is non-culpable, or whether, in order not to 
be culpable, the conduct must be nonnegligent as well. 
117. I suspect that those who believe that voluntariness is necessarily a component of a 
norm violation but that awareness is not might be misled by the confession-and-avoidance 
character of excuses such as mistake of fact. Some pleas of confession and avoidance do confess 
something of normative significance. Duress is the prime example: I acknowledge that I did 
wrong (morally or criminally), but I'm not to blame. But not all such pleas are like that. When 
Lisa confesses to having caused the school's destruction, but pleads ignorance of the critical 
facts in avoidance, she is denying not her blameworthiness, or not only this, but also the 
logically prior fact of wrongfulness. Here, I think, confession and avoidance reflects only a 
dialectical structure, not a normative one. The dialectical structure is created by the fact that the 
accuser will naturally speak first in terms of objective or external facts, leaving it to the accused 
to fill in details about her mental states and the like about which she has privileged access. That 
the accuser does not, in one breath as it were, charge that the accused did x, and that she knew 
she was doing x, is really a matter only of dialectical convenience; there is no normative import. 
My treatment of defenses (see Figure 4) therefore relies somewhat on convention. 
Conceptually, ex post normative or ascriptive assessment tends to proceed in this order: (1) are 
the external requirements atisfied (e.g., did the actor trespass on another's land; did she cause 
another's death)?; (2) if so, did she act with any of the proscribed "mental states" of purpose, 
knowledge, recklessness, or negligence (i.e., can the actor claim any mistakes or accidents)?; (3) 
if not, was the actor justified?; and (4) if not, was she excused? This hierarchy is familiar. What 
is perhaps not familiar is that there exist significant differences in the way that one step relates 
to the one preceding it. A fairly important conceptual distinction separates the latter two 
questions, tracking the distinction between wrongfulness and blameworthiness. But no 
consideration of comparable force separates culpability determinations from justifications (steps 
(2) and (3)). Thus, once we determine (which we need not) that justifications hould be treated 
as defenses and associated closely with excuses, there is no reason in principle that culpability 
determinations could not join them. Put another way, the distinction between infringement and 
violation-culpability determinations going to the former, justifications going to the latter-may 
be supported more by intuitive, largely unarticulated, notions of statistical ordinariness, and by 
simple convention, than by anything of greater normative substance. This truth is reflected in 
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no stigma is thought to apply, a rule that does not presuppose the 
actor's awareness of the preconditions for its applicability might be 
thought either confused or otiose. 
Ironically, Robinson himself can be read as lending support to 
this view: 
To say 'do not use force against another unless you think the other is 
attacking you' may sound like a rule of conduct but is simply a 
compression of two distinct points. The rule of conduct says 'do not 
use force unless another is attacking you'; but we understand that in 
application you can only act on what you know or believe. That 
second issue, of belief, is not an issue that one must deal with in 
stating the rule of conduct; it only becomes relevant in adjudicating 
failures to follow the rule (to satisfy the ideal)."s 
This is an important passage. If we understand (as we should) that 
one can only be expected to act on what she believes (which is not 
inconsistent with imposing a duty, itself triggered by what the actor 
believes, to gather more information under specified circumstances), 
then the reason that one need not deal with issues of belief "in stating 
the rule of conduct" is only because such issues are already implied. 
So, it's not that issues of belief aren't incorporated into the conduct 
rules (the statement of the norms), but rather that they need not be 
incorporated explicitly because the implication of their inclusion is 
already so strong. Issues of belief do, as Robinson acknowledges, 
become relevant at the stage of adjudication."1 But that is not through 
the application of any ancillary rule; it is from attending to the 
primary norm's necessary implication. 
The bottom line, I suggest, is this. It may make sense to fine-tune 
verdicts so as to distinguish exculpations based on the absence of 
violation from exculpations for reason of blamelessness. But even if 
so, want of the minimum requisite culpability (usually recklessness or 
negligence) should probably make out the former if, as Robinson 
insists, the criminal law's educative function is so critical.20 When an 
the still-incomplete historical transition of issue (2) from defenses (under the guise of "mistakes 
of fact") to offense elements (as per Model Penal Code-style kinds of culpability). 
118. Robinson, supra note 14, at 64-65. 
119. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
120. Over a decade ago, Robinson acknowledged his critics' suggestion that some mental 
components should go within the rules of conduct, see Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and 
Principles of Adjudication, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 736 n.9 (1990), but demurred largely on the 
ground that "[t]he harmfulness of conduct does not always depend on the actor's subjective 
state of mind," id. at 738. 
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actor makes mistakes (at least nonnegligent ones) about elements, the 
criminal law should not be deemed violated. And that conclusion has 
major implications for the construction of justification defenses. Even 
if "every case adjudication" should be viewed as a vehicle "to tell the 
community which conduct is approved ('justified') and which conduct 
is disapproved even though the offender at hand may not be punished 
for it ('excused'),"'21 it is very doubtful that a pure "deeds theory" 
does it accurately. 
In thus denying Robinson's claim that justifications must be 
objective, I do not mean, however, to assert the more nearly opposite 
position that they must be subjective, i.e., that it is part of the nature 
of a prescriptive norm that it must assume the world as perceived by 
the norm's addressee. I have endeavored merely to highlight some 
reasons why a culture might want to understand its norms in such a 
way. I have tried to explain, in other words, why any nonnegligent 
mistakes about justification that the society's criminal law in fact 
codifies as defenses might be better understood as themselves 
justifications, not excuses. It does not follow, though, that there exist 
no reasons why a culture would want its norms to hold subjects to a 
higher standard of conduct, one predicated upon an idealization of 
their epistemic situation.'22 Trade-offs, after all, are unavoidable. 
Whereas a radically subjective construction of norms is most 
sympathetic to the regime's subjects, a radically objective 
construction is more aspirational. It is hard to see what it would be 
about the nature of normativity that would fix as necessary one or 
another position with regard to this trade-off.'23 
In short, it seems perfectly coherent for a norm to accommodate 
the actual or reasonable beliefs, even if mistaken, of its addressees in 
121. ROBINSON, supra note 7, at 123-24. 
122. Strictly speaking, this would not run afoul of the maxim that "ought implies can," for an 
actor could act in accord with guiding reasons even if she does not apprehend the facts that 
make those reasons applicable to her situation. Of course, the proximity with which the 
objective vision of norms comes to violating that bedrock principle of normative reasoning 
might persuade many against that vision. On the other hand, objectivists could take that same 
proximity as weighing against ought-implies-can itself. 
123. As Joshua Dressier puts it, "[a] society realistically cannot ask more of people than to 
act in conformity with reasonable appearances." Dressier, supra note 12, at 93. This could be 
quibbled with. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that a society cannot realistically ask more of 
people than to act in conformity with their actual perceptions, after having made appropriate 
(reasonable?) efforts to verify whether those perceptions are accurate. In any event, the 
qualifier realistically is doing a lot of work. The nub of the disagreement between subjectivists 
and objectivists, I suggest, precisely concerns how realistic a normative system must, or 
should, be. 
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directing behavior, or to hold addressees to a higher idealized 
standard. A particular normative regime could develop with either 
orientation without violating anything essential to normativity. If so, 
whether a given society and its norm entrepreneurs (such as the legal 
elites responsible for its criminal law) should conceive of its criminal 
law in subjective or objective terms should depend upon arguments of 
political morality and practicality. It will be easier for all 
contributors-Robinson included-to focus on the merits of his 
argument if it is more clearly detached from arguments about 
conceptual or logical necessity. Those are red herrings.'24 
124. This position-that the subjectivists and objectivists are engaged in a debate over what 
legal prohibitions should look like and how norms should be understood, and not about the 
inherent meaning or nature of justification-contradicts John Gardner's claim in a provocative 
recent article that, as a matter of practical reasoning, a justification exists only when subjective 
and objective requirements are both satisfied. See Gardner, supra note 14, at 106. Although a 
complete response cannot be attempted here, some remarks are in order. 
Gardner holds, in brief, that "from whatever point of view one claims justification for 
one's actions or beliefs, one claims justification only if one claims both that there were, from 
that point of view, reasons for one to act or believe as one did and that one's reasons for 
performing the act or holding the belief were among these reasons." Id. Effectively anticipating 
my suggestion that a justification could lie under the criminal law when supported by guiding 
reasons but not explanatory ones, or conversely, Gardner responds that 
even if English criminal law were found to use the word 'justification' in some 
different, technical sense, that would be a matter of little concern for present 
purposes. Our interest is not in the legal meaning of the word 'justification'. Our 
interest is in the ordinary phenomenon, that of justification, which still plays a major 
role in the thinking of most criminal courts, and indeed in evaluative thinking at large, 
whatever the local lawyers and legal commentators may choose to call it. 
Id. I am skeptical, however, that the prospect that justifications need not require the 
conjunction of objective and subjective considerations can be waved away quite so easily. 
Gardner is surely correct that the relevant question is not how criminal law practitioners 
use the word "justification." (For one thing, if the concept of legal justification does not loom 
large for them, they may use the word, unreflectively, as referring only to moral justification.) 
But nor is it, as Gardner apparently would have it, what justification means in some ideal sense 
abstracted from the context of the criminal law. In my view, the question that animates the 
literature to which Gardner purports to respond concerns how to describe the conceptual 
structure or logic that already shapes extant criminal law. And insofar as this is our interest, then 
Gardner's assertion that a legal system which drafts or conceives justifications in wholly 
objective (or, one might add, wholly subjective) terms is "a legal system which, strictly speaking, 
does not care about justification at all," id. at 118, seems nonresponsive. More precisely, it 
responds only by denying the underlying intuition that such a system, just by virtue of being a 
normative system, necessarily "cares about" justification in at least some sense. Therefore, 
before accepting Gardner's answer, it behooves us at least to search for a sense of justification 
that accommodates the intuition. The revised conception here advanced-pursuant to which a 
justification defense defeats the presumption that given conduct is criminal-meets that need. 
We have, then, two competing conceptions of justifications under the criminal law. And before 
we can claim that one is not "strictly speaking" faithful to the meaning of justification, I should 
think we need some explicit criteria for choosing between conceptual schemata. While I could 
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B. Unknowing Justification 
The converse of the mistaken (or "putative") justification 
problem arises when an actor assaults another person under 
circumstances that would allow the actor a justification had he known 
of the relevant facts,125 but he did not. This situation of "unknowing 
justification" is often called the "Dadson problem" after the famous 
1850 case in which a police officer was prosecuted for shooting a man 
in flight from the commission of a petty theft.'26 The criminal code 
authorized officers to shoot escaping felons, but this minor larceny 
wasn't classified as a felony unless the thief was a third-time offender. 
It turns out that, unbeknownst to Constable Dadson at the time, the 
thief did have several prior felony convictions, and so was committing 
a felony. The claimed justification was held unavailable, however, and 
Dadson was convicted of shooting with intent to cause grievous 
bodily harm.'27 
Again, whether this was the proper outcome represents a 
straightforward question of criminal law policy (broadly understood): 
Is it worth criminal law resources, and is it consistent with our 
principles of criminal justice, to require actual belief in the 
circumstances that, if believed, would justify harm-causing conduct?'28 
not hope to do justice to the issue here, it does seem to me that, insofar as we can appeal only to 
intuition and utility, the more catholic account here presented stacks up well. 
125. A reasons approach would require, in addition, that such knowledge constitute the 
motivation or explanatory reason for the actor's conduct. See supra note 14. 
126. Regina v. Dadson, 4 Cox C.C. 360 (Crim. App. 1850). 
127. Id. at 361. In a much more recent instance of unknowing justification, an Israeli thief 
stole an innocent-looking backpack left in public only to discover that it contained a terrorist 
bomb, which he subsequently reported to the police. The thief was thought to have saved many 
lives and was not prosecuted, thereby saving the Israeli courts from having to confront the 
Dadson problem themselves. See generally Robinson, supra note 95. 
128. As J.C. Smith argued, the question "was whether the defence on which Dadson relied 
requires ... knowledge of the facts which justify the arrest and the use of force to effect it. This, 
I suggest, is a matter of policy. There is no rule of logic which requires it to be answered one 
way or the other." SMITH, supra note 37, at 31; see also id. at 32 ("Whether knowledge of the 
facts should be required to found a defence, be it justification or excuse, is... a matter of 
policy."). I think Smith entirely correct, although it seems to me that things become muddied a 
bit when Smith responds to a reductio advanced by Glanville Williams. Williams had declared 
the result in Dadson absurd on the ground that it would follow that "a British soldier who kills 
an enemy in action, believing himself to be killing his own drill-sergeant, is guilty of murder." 
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 25 (2d ed. 1961). In response, Smith agreed that a 
murder conviction in the latter case would be preposterous, but distinguished the two cases on 
the grounds that "[m]urder has for centuries been defined as the killing of a person 'under the 
Queen's peace,'" and that "[a]n enemy soldier making war against the Queen is not under the 
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It is easy enough to draft a statute that provides for either of these 
outcomes. Ruminations about the inherent meaning or true nature of 
justification would not seem to advance the debate.'29 
But again, Robinson offers a hypothetical designed to show that 
the subjective view-which withholds justification when the 
defendant is unaware of facts that, if known, would make out a 
justification-gives "improper results."'30 Imagine, he proposes, that 
B is poised to attack A, thereby conferring upon A a justification 
defense under the deeds approach. A is unaware of this danger. 
Coincidentally, however, and for his own bad reasons, A decides to 
assault B. Bystander C knows all of the foregoing. He knows, that is, 
that A is an "unknowingly justified actor."'31 Nonetheless, because C 
prefers B to A, he assaults A to prevent A's assault upon B. Does C 
have a defense? Robinson thinks it obvious that he shouldn't.'32 But, 
he says, the reasons theory would confer one: Because A doesn't 
know that he would be justified in assaulting B, his force upon B is 
unlawful, thereby permitting C to resist it-even though C knows that 
B is an assailant.'33 
There is much to say in response. First, why A is objectively 
justified, rather than B, is not transparently obvious. It has been 
doubted that this conclusion reflects an underlying fact of the matter, 
rather than mere narrative thrust.'34 But even if we accept Robinson's 
Queen's peace so an element in the definition of the crime of murder is missing." SMITH, supra 
note 37, at 30-31. 
Instead of deferring to this contingent definition of murder in a manner that would seem 
to naturalize it, Smith would have done better, it seems to me, to make clear that the absurdity 
of convicting the soldier of murder-if absurd it be-would arise simply from bad policy, not 
conceptual error. This would be more consistent with his apt conclusion that 
"[p]olicy" should surely determine whether this person is guilty of a crime, or of no 
crime. If, as a matter of policy, we think he was truly "justified" in doing what he did, 
it should be no crime. But if policy requires him to be convicted, it should surely be of 
the consummated crime [rather than of an attempt]. 
Id. at 44. 
129. Cf Anthony M. Dillof, Unraveling Unknowing Justification, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1547, 1556-58, 1599 (2002) (criticizing what he calls "definitional arguments" in favor of another 
approach, called the "harm theory," to the unknowing justification problem). 
130. Robinson, supra note 14, at 59. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. For an intriguing argument that the deeds theory produces logical contradiction in 
Dadson-type cases, see Russell L. Christopher, Unknowing Justification and the Logical 
Necessity of the Dadson Principle in Self-Defence, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 229, 239-45 
(1995). Again, I think Christopher's inventive argument is flawed. Very briefly, it seems to me 
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premise that A and not B is objectively justified, it is still unclear that 
C is not permitted to interfere with A's (subjectively unjustified) 
efforts to kill B. I should think it depends mightily upon the nature of 
C's interference. It is perhaps telling, therefore, that while Robinson 
says that B "intends to kill" A, and that A "draws a gun to shoot" B, 
he consistently refers to C's action only in terms of "resistance" and 
"interference."'35 It would seem that an objective theory of 
justification that purports to turn on the realization of net societal 
benefits would find C justified if his interference inflicts less harm on 
A than A would otherwise have inflicted upon B.136 
Finally and most importantly, even supposing that C kills A to 
protect B, there is not the slightest reason why a subjective approach 
to justification need provide C with a defense. A penal code could 
provide, for instance, that an actor may not use force against a person 
in response to force that the actor believes would be lawful were it 
not for that other person's mistaken beliefs about the circumstances 
in which he acts. That the Model Penal Code appears not to reach this 
same result is, at most, a criticism of that particular code;137 it does not 
tell against subjective constructions of justification defenses 
more generally. 
that, contrary to Christopher's assertions, id. at 244, an objectivist has access to a perfectly 
coherent notion of the initial aggressor, one that turns on the particular point in time at which 
an actor consciously determines to employ force. Still, because adequate development of this 
argument would require more space than is here warranted, I am satisfied to leave this as a 
partly open question. 
135. Robinson, supra note 14, at 59. 
136. Bear in mind that the law would not permit C to allow B to inflict any further injury 
upon A after C has successfully nullified A's threat to B. Both tort law and criminal law would 
impose upon C an affirmative duty to try to protect A from B if C's interference leaves A unable 
to protect himself against B. 
137. Robinson is probably right that, under the MPC, C could be exculpated even if he 
employs deadly force. But that outcome is not for the reasons he gives. Robinson claims that, 
under the MPC, C "lawfully can interfere with conduct that is 'unlawful'." Robinson, supra note 
14, at 59 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE ? 3.06). Assuming that this citation reflects a 
typographical error (section 3.06 concerns the use of force for the protection of property), and 
that the intended citation is to section 3.05, we have already seen that this is not so. See supra 
note 83. Section 3.05 provides that C lawfully can protect B against unlawful force only if, under 
the circumstances as C believes them to be, B "would be justified in using such protective 
force." MODEL PENAL CODE ? 3.05(1)(b) (1962). And B would not be justified in using deadly 
force against A if his intent to kill A is deemed to have "provoked the use of force against 
himself in the same encounter." Id. ? 3.04(2)(b)(i). I'd be inclined to say that A's lack of 
awareness of the potentially provocative circumstances prevents satisfaction of this provision, 
which is why I believe that Robinson's bottom-line judgment about the Model Penal Code is 
correct. But it could be easily corrected without having to resort to an objective 
conceptualization of the defense. 
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Even were Robinson to become convinced that no desired 
outcome in complex unknowing-justification cases is beyond the 
reach of a subjectivist approach, that would be unlikely to give him 
pause. For even in those contexts (of mistaken justification), where he 
already does recognize that purely subjective approaches can be 
modified to reach the outcomes he deems substantively proper, he 
disparages such approaches by emphasizing that they require "fancy 
dancing"138 or "complicated manoeuvres."139 In fact, Robinson too 
must resort to some fairly recondite legal drafting to ensure that the 
objective approach produces the intuitively correct outcomes.1'" But 
that, to my mind, is no criticism of the objective approach generally, 
nor of Robinson's proposal in particular. Because it's no easier in the 
138. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Testing Competing Theories of Justification, 76 
N.C. L. REV. 1095, 1102 (1998). 
139. Robinson, supra note 14, at 60. 
140. This is best exemplified by a straightforward case of unknowing justification. Although 
the actor is objectively justified, Robinson has recognized that full exculpation would be 
inappropriate and has therefore argued repeatedly that the actor should be convicted of an 
attempted offense. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 14, at 57-58; Robinson, supra note 1, at 291; 
Robinson & Darley, supra note 138, at 1101. Remarkably, however, his own proposed Codes of 
Conduct and Adjudication appear not to produce that result. Most persons who are objectively 
but unknowingly justified would be fully exculpated under Part IV of the Code of Conduct, 
which makes actual necessity the touchstone for the valid use of defensive force. See ROBINSON, 
supra note 7, app A. Part IV (Draft Code of Conduct, "Justified Violations of the Criminal 
Law"). To realize his desired outcome, then, Robinson would have to rely upon something like 
the Model Penal Code's impossible attempt provision, which provides that an actor "is guilty of 
an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for 
commission of the crime, he purposely engages in conduct that would constitute the crime if the 
attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be." MODEL PENAL CODE ? 501(1)(a); see, 
e.g., Robinson, supra note 14, at 57 (citing this provision favorably for resolving cases of 
unknowing justification). But as persons who have taught this provision know, it is hardly free 
of "gyrations," id. at 53, and nonetheless remains far from pellucid. Most particularly, it raises 
all the uncertainties that attend identification of "attendant circumstances." 
For another illustration, consider this hypothetical proposed by Kent Greenawalt: 
"Imagine that David, wishing to die as an apparent victim, has cleverly set things up so that 
Vicki will think David is trying to shoot her and will shoot him in return." Greenawalt, supra 
note 12, at 1924. If Evelyn, who had known of David's plan, happens upon the scene 
immediately after Vicki has drawn her gun, may Evelyn shoot Vicki? If David himself changes 
his mind after Vicki draws her gun, and decides he wants to live, should he be legally permitted 
to shoot her dead? See also Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 23 (advancing a similar hypothetical). 
A deeds theory would appear to answer both questions in the affirmative, given that Vicki's 
threatened use of force is only "excused" and thus "unlawful." But I should think it absurd to 
acquit either Vicki or David. As best I can tell, though, Robinson's Rules of Conduct and 
Adjudication lead to precisely that result in the case of Vicki. What result would obtain in 
David's case, especially in light of Section 240 ("Causing the Conditions of One's Own 
Justification or Excuse"), I leave for the intrepid reader to determine. See ROBINSON, supra 
note 7, app. B ? 240 (Draft Code of Adjudication, "Causing the Conditions of One's Own 
Justification or Excuse"). 
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criminal law than elsewhere to draft a statute adequate for all 
contingencies, only a peculiarly naive vision of law would take 
statutory complexity as a signal either of conceptual poverty or 
disingenuousness. 
In sum, a desire to reach certain intuitively proper results-in 
situations of mistaken justification and unknowing justification 
alike-does not logically compel adoption of subjective or objective 
conceptions of legal justification. This is one of the principal lessons 
of the revised conception of the justification/excuse distinction. 
IV. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS 
Although much of the literature on justification and excuse 
focuses on the subjective/objective debate, that question does not 
exhaust commentators' interest. This Part scrutinizes two other often- 
discussed issues. Section A demonstrates that, on the revised account, 
classifying a particular defense as justification or excuse entails no 
necessary consequences for the treatment of third parties. Section B 
returns to issues of taxonomy. After cautioning against efforts to 
classify existing defenses like "self-defense" and "defense of 
property," it turns attention to two defenses the proper classification 
of which has consumed substantial scholarly attention-the quasi- 
defense of provocation that reduces murder to voluntary 
manslaughter, and the true defense of duress that affords full 
exculpation. This Section provides reasons to conclude that each is 
better classified as an excuse. 
A. Third Parties 
One frequent claim about the essential or logical relationship 
between justification and excuse goes like this: When conduct is 
protected by a justification defense, third parties may help the actor, 
and may not hinder her; when conduct is excused, third parties may 
hinder, and may not help.'41 Of course, the analysis of Part III 
demonstrates that this is not necessarily so when the actor and the 
third party have different factual beliefs. If we are now to confront 
new issues worth additional comment, the claim at issue must be that 
where an actor (A) and a third party (C) share the same perceptions 
about a given situation, then if A is justified, C may help him and may 
141. See, e.g., LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS 65 (1987); Dressier, supra note 
12, at 77; Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 1918. 
This content downloaded from 130.91.146.35 on Wed, 8 Oct 2014 19:28:18 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2003] JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE 63 
not hinder him, and if A is only excused, then C may not help him and 
may hinder him. If A is neither justified nor excused, of course, C also 
may not help, and may hinder. Call this (multi-part) claim the 
"necessary implication" thesis. Is it true? If so, what does that reveal? 
Whether it is true depends upon the strength and nature of the 
reasons for giving the primary actor legal permission to act. In 
necessity cases, where A's action is thought to produce greater good, 
C should of course be permitted to help, and not to hinder. Take 
Robinson's example of the firebreak: A ignites B's farm to save an 
adjoining town from a raging forest fire. Surely, if A is justified, then 
C must be allowed to assist. But this is due not to any necessary logic 
of justifications, but rather to the specific reasons that support 
granting A legal permission in the first place. If we think this is a good 
thing for A to do, then we would need a reason for prohibiting C from 
helping or for allowing C to hinder, and that there could be any such 
reason deserving solicitude seems highly unlikely.142 In short, we 
should be thinking in terms of reasons for treating the primary and 
third party differently, and not for conceptual truths. 
This point is best illustrated by self-defense cases. Recall Albert 
who shoots and kills Bushrod in self-defense, but in circumstances in 
which Albert knows he could have safely retreated.143 Let us suppose 
that Albert was in his own home. One could reasonably believe both 
that most people will retreat if they can, no matter what the law 
allows, and that ex post adjudications of whether safe retreat would 
have been possible are too likely either to produce false positives 
(thus resulting in punishment of morally and legally innocent 
persons) or to put excessive pressure on law-abiding folk to attempt 
retreats that are in fact unsafe. For these reasons, I argued, a rational 
law might refrain from imposing a duty of retreat in one's own home 
(though I should add that a contrary rule would also be defensible). If 
the law takes that approach, Albert has a valid defense of self-defense 
and is, legally speaking, justified. 
Suppose now that Clarisse, Albert's neighbor, happens to be 
over for coffee, and that both parties realize that Bushrod has it out 
only for Albert, not Clarisse. If Albert's gun jams, and he asks 
142. Of course, it would not be illogical to allow B (the second party) to try to stop A, 
though it might be bad policy. And even if B is not allowed (i.e., would not be justified) to stop 
A, she might still warrant an excuse if she did. But to focus on B's status is essentially to reprise 
the human shield hypothetical discussed earlier. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
143. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. 
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Clarisse to hand over the sidearm she's packing, the law's internal 
coherence would not be challenged were Clarisse criminally 
prohibited from doing so. Whatever concerns may militate against 
requiring the threatened victims of an assault to try to assess whether 
safe retreat is possible before protecting themselves with defensive 
force do not also apply to bystanders who could be expected to be 
able more coolly to assess the situation. Or so lawmakers may 
reasonably conclude. So the fact that Albert has a justification 
defense does not necessarily imply that Clarisse would also be legally 
justified were she to aid him in assaulting Bushrod. Perhaps her legal 
duty should be to encourage Albert to make use of the safe retreat 
that they both realize exists. 
Of course, this might be seen as evidence that Albert's defense is 
only an excuse, and not a justification as I had earlier claimed. If 
Albert is only excused, then Clarisse's lack of a defense would only 
confirm the necessary implication thesis. The problem is that 
although Clarisse might be denied a defense, she needn't be. A 
criminal code that permitted all third parties to assist persons who are 
themselves permitted to resist unlawful force would hardly be 
unintelligible or internally contradictory. So the necessary implication 
thesis is still shown to be invalid. Again, this is a drafting issue, not a 
conceptual one. Policy judgments about what should be done with 
third parties have no bearing on the conceptual distinction between 
justification and excuse. 
B. Classifying the Defenses 
It is a common move among criminal law theorists-especially 
those advancing arguments for law reform-to try to demonstrate 
that a particular defense is properly classified either as a justification 
or as an excuse. To take just one example, a major symposium on 
"battered women who kill" was explicitly shaped by the premise that 
we can best determine how such women should fare under the 
criminal law only after we first make clear whether self-defense is a 
justification or an excuse.'44 This last Section explores how this 
enterprise should proceed if the revised conception of justification 
and excuse I've proposed is correct. How ought we to categorize the 
standard defenses such as necessity, duress, duress of circumstances, 
144. See Symposium, Self Defense and Relations of Domination: Moral and Legal 
Perspectives on Battered Women Who Kill, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 461 (1996). 
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defense of self, defense of others, and defense of property? Which are 
justifications, and which are excuses? 
1. Some Cautionary Notes. A classificatory enterprise of this sort 
is risky, for the unarticulated assumption that all the particular rules 
that fall within one of the broad doctrinal categories must be 
classified alike is simply false. I have already indicated that the 
categories of justification and excuse are straddled by statutes that do 
not preclude use of the duress defense when the defendant who is 
confronted with a powerful threat actually chooses the lesser evil.'145 
When the actor commits a lesser evil than the evil that would have 
resulted (by natural forces or by human agency) were he to have 
acted otherwise, then he is presumably justified. When, even though 
he selected the greater evil, he is granted a defense because a person 
of reasonable firmness could not have been expected to have done 
otherwise, then he is most likely excused.146 Furthermore, the defenses 
involving defensive force are likely to be complex amalgams of 
justifications and excuses.147 Perhaps, for instance, use of deadly force 
to protect oneself from physical attack is justified, but to protect 
oneself from robbery is only excused. Or use of force is excused when 
retreat is possible, but justified where retreat is impossible. Or, 
unavoidable mistakes are justified, whereas (merely) reasonable 
mistakes are excused. 
To see this point more clearly, it might be useful first to identify 
the different defenses. Quick: How many are there? Although the 
precise number will vary from code to code, I'd predict that many 
people would guess around a dozen. Here, for example, is a list of 
defenses one might generate from a glance at the Model Penal Code: 
(involuntary) intoxication, duress, military orders, consent (by the 
victim), de minimis infraction, entrapment, choice of (lesser) evils, 
execution of public duty, use of force in self-protection, use of force 
for the protection of other persons, use of force for the protection of 
property, use of force in law enforcement, use of force by persons 
145. See supra note 64; see also Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 16 (identifying duress as an 
example of a defense that "reach[es] instances of both justification and excuse"). 
146. More precisely, whether he is justified or excused in this latter event depends upon 
one's view of what the criminal law should (nominally) demand of members of the public. For 
elaboration of this issue see infra notes 172-76 and accompanying text. 
147. This is not to agree with those who say that all defenses contain elements of 
justification and excuse. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 14, at 122. As I have conceived 
justifications and excuses, this is not so. 
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with special responsibility for care, discipline or safety of others, 
mental disease or defect, and immaturity. That's fifteen.148 
If we look more carefully at any one of these provisions, 
however, the picture changes. Take, for instance, Model Penal Code 
section 3.06, "Use of Force for Protection of Property." This lengthy 
section expressly distinguishes among a large number of variables: 
whether the property protected is movable, real, or a dwelling; 
whether the force used is deadly, nondeadly, consists of confinement, 
or is executed by "device"; whether the actor did or did not request 
desistance before employing force; and (because it is expressly made 
subject to a separate provision, section 3.09) whether the actor 
behaved reasonably, negligently, or recklessly.'49 This one section, 
then, could be seen actually to consist of scores of discrete rules.1M For 
example: 
* An actor may use nondeadly force against the person of 
another when the actor reasonably believes that such force is 
immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the unlawful 
carrying away of tangible, movable property, provided that 
such movable property is in his possession and the actor first 
requests the person against whom such force is used to desist 
from his interference with the property.'1 
* In any prosecution for which negligence does not suffice to 
establish culpability, an actor may use nondeadly force 
against the person of another, without first requesting the 
person against whom such force is used to desist from his 
interference with the property in question, when the actor 
nonrecklessly believes that such force is immediately 
necessary to prevent or terminate the unlawful carrying away 
of tangible, movable property, that the property is in the 
148. These are the personal (i.e., non-systemic) defenses of the general part. The list would 
be greatly expanded were we to include (a) "defenses" that merely negative the prosecution's 
prima facie case (e.g., alibi or somnambulism), or (b) defenses particular to specific offenses 
(e.g., "the spousal defense" recognized in some jurisdictions to sexual assaults). For a much 
longer list that includes these sorts of defenses, see 1 ROBINSON, supra note 13, at 70. 
149. MODEL PENAL CODE ? 3.09 (1962). 
150. On the difficulties of rule individualization, see, for example, A.M. Honor6, Real Laws, 
in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY 99, 111 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977) (raising the 
possibility that "every prima-facie universal proposition of law which may be the subject of 
debate is a separate rule"). 
151. MODEL PENALCODE ?? 3.06(1)(a), (3)(a)(ii). 
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possession of another person for whose protection he acts, 
and that such request would be useless.152 
S In any prosecution for which recklessness does not suffice to 
establish culpability, an actor may use deadly force against 
the person of another if he believes that the other person is 
attempting to dispossess him of his dwelling otherwise than 
under a claim of right to its possession.'3 
If these are "rules," however, so too could each be called a 
"defense"-respectively, the defenses of, say, "Reasonable use of 
nondeadly force for the prevention of interference with movable 
property belonging to oneself," "Non-reckless use of nondeadly force 
for the prevention of interference with movable property belonging 
to another, prior request thought useless," and "Use of deadly force 
for protection against dispossession of dwelling." And if sections are 
carved up into more granular defenses in this fashion, the total 
number of defenses recognized by the Model Penal Code would 
easily reach into the hundreds. 
Of course, it would be foolish for any penal code to list each such 
defense separately. Some sort of groupings are called for. However, 
no single way to organize the defenses is natural or transparently 
correct. The code drafters could, for example, group defenses under 
such headings as "Defenses involving use of deadly force," "Defenses 
involving use of nondeadly force," and "Defenses not involving use of 
force." Or perhaps the hundreds of defenses could be classified 
according to the relationship between the actor's beliefs and objective 
reality made relevant by the offense under which he is charged. Here 
we might have five separate categories of defenses: "Defenses that do 
not rely upon factual error," "Defenses relying upon nonnegligent 
error," "Defenses relying upon negligence," "Defenses relying upon 
recklessness," and "Defenses entailing substantial divergence from 
reality." 
As we have seen, the drafters of the Model Penal Code chose the 
mostly familiar categories mentioned above-duress, entrapment, 
choice of lesser evils, use of force in self-protection, use of force for 
the protection of property, and the like. And, all in all, it seems like a 
sensible enough decision. What is not sensible, though, is for theorists 
to then expect that these groupings of defenses would be wholly 
subsumable under the different categorizing scheme of justification 
152. Id. 
153. Id. ? 3.06(3)(d)(i). 
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and excuse. In fact, it may be impossible to authoritatively classify 
even individual discrete defenses as justification or excuse, partly 
because classification is itself an interpretive act, not purely an 
inquiry into historical facts,'54 and partly because, more mundanely, a 
defense might exist because some legislators deemed it a justification 
and others thought it an excuse.'55 But even if each granular defense 
could be identified as either a justification or an excuse, to expect 
larger groupings of defenses to line up neatly under the headings of 
justification and excuse--to suppose, in other words, that existing 
defense categories (such as duress or self-defense) relate to the 
conceptual categories of justification and excuse as token to type, or 
as species to genus1'56-is bizarre. This is something like inventorying 
all the items in your house, classifying them by color, and then 
expecting each category of items to be classifiable as a unit within a 
distinct taxonomic scheme. It could happen, say, that all your reds are 
edible and all your yellows inedible, but it would be nothing short of 
marvelous. 
Take the above defenses culled from the Model Penal Code's 
omnibus protection-of-property defense, MPC section 3.06. What I've 
labeled "Reasonable use of nondeadly force for the prevention of 
interference with movable property belonging to oneself" sure looks 
like a justification: the state is probably intending to permit 
individuals to use nondeadly force when they reasonably believe it 
necessary in such circumstances. But whether the same is true for 
"Non-reckless use of nondeadly force for the prevention of 
interference with movable property belonging to another, prior 
request thought useless" is less certain. Perhaps the MPC drafters 
would have liked to prohibit individuals from protecting movable 
property with force before requesting desistance, except where the 
actor believes that such a request "would be dangerous to himself or 
154. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 60, at 631 n.13: 
The taxonomic distinction between conduct rules and decision rules should not be 
taken to imply the existence of a single identifiable source of legal norms, a source 
whose actual intentions determine the segregation of the norms into the two 
categories. Rather, the classification of legal rules is a scheme of interpretation based 
on the values and policies that the interpreter ascribes to the legal system .... That a 
legislature in fact entertained certain intentions may, but need not, be reason to 
ascribe particular values to the legislation. 
155. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 18-19. 
156. Douglas N. Husak, The Serial View of Criminal Law Defenses, 3 CRIM. L.F. 369, 371 
n.l (1992). 
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another person,"'"5 but also believed it unjust or unwise to punish 
those who didn't first request desistance simply because they thought 
it useless. Were that the case, the defense might more properly be 
deemed an excuse. 
In short, the justification/excuse taxonomy and the taxonomy 
created by existing doctrinal categories operate on different principles 
of organization. One operates at a fairly high level of conceptual 
abstraction, the other turns upon factors closer to actual human 
experience. There is thus little reason to suspect that either is 
subsumed under the other. Any single taxonomy that mixes these two 
types of organizing rubrics (like that sketched in Figure 4), therefore, 
is at best no more than suggestive. At worst, it must be conceded, 
such a taxonomy threatens to confuse."8 
2. Duress and Provocation. Notwithstanding these caveats, we 
can hazard some classificatory remarks. On the account here 
presented, for instance, duress looks like a paradigmatic excuse. Dan- 
Cohen explains the rationale clearly, deeming it 
obvious that the policies advanced by the defense would lead to its 
use as a decision rule-an instruction to the judge that defendants 
who under duress committed acts that would otherwise amount to 
offenses should not be punished. Just as obviously, no comparable 
rule would be included among the conduct rules of the system: 
knowledge of the existence of the defense of duress would not be 
permitted to shape individual conduct; conduct would be guided 
? ? 
159 
exclusively by the relevant criminal proscriptions.1 
On this account, and for other reasons that are assimilable to it, 
that duress is an excuse has become common wisdom. In a 
provocative recent article, however, Peter Westen and James 
157. MODEL PENAL CODE ? 3.06(3)(a)(ii). Subsection (3)(a)(i), recall, extends the defense 
to persons who do not first request desistance for the seemingly less compelling reason that they 
believe "such request would be useless." 
158. This is to take issue with the "premise ... that a single legal doctrine, especially one in 
the criminal arena, should be justified in terms of a single philosophical rationale." Claire O. 
Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense in Law, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 251, 252 
(1995). The premise would be plausible (though I am not myself convinced) when applied to a 
truly granular doctrine, one that cannot be sensibly subdivided into identifiably distinct rules. 
But even that plausibility is lost, I think, once we recognize that what is generally taken to be "a 
single legal doctrine"-like self-defense--may encompass more than one discrete legal rule. 
159. Dan-Cohen, supra note 60, at 633. 
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Mangiafico contend that duress is actually a justification.'6 Their 
subtle argument arises in response to what they deem "[t]he central 
challenge" of being able "to explain why defenses of duress... 
provide actors with greater protection against manmade threats than 
defenses of necessity provide against natural threats."'61 If, for 
example, a driver runs over and kills two people asleep on the road 
because a gunman sitting beside her threatens to kill her unless she 
proceeds straight ahead, the driver may win exculpation on grounds 
of duress.162 In contrast, the driver has no defense if she runs over the 
same two people because hazardous road conditions left her with the 
only alternative under the circumstances of driving off the road and 
over a precipice to her certain death. Necessity is unavailable in this 
latter case because in killing two to save just herself she did not 
choose "the lesser evil." Duress is unavailable because it ordinarily 
extends only to manmade threats.163 
Almost all commentators, Westen and Mangiafico observe, both 
view duress as an excuse and maintain that this disparity is 
indefensible.164 "Conservatives" would deny the defense in the 
gunman case; "liberals" would extend it to the hazardous road case.165 
But maybe, the authors argue, the law is wiser than we are. Perhaps 
criticisms of the disparate treatment that duress law affords manmade 
and natural threats 
on the part of conservative and liberal commentators are the 
product of a common fallacy-a fallacy concerning the standard by 
which "evils" are measured for purposes of the choice-of-evils 
defense. The standard by which evils are measured is not one that 
places evils in a single ranked order for all purposes. Rather, the 
160. Peter Westen & James Mangiafico, The Defense of Criminal Duress: A Justification, 
Not an Excuse--and Why it Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 
103, on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
161. Id. (manuscript at 101). 
162. This assumes that the jurisdiction does not categorically disallow duress as a defense in 
cases of homicide. Obviously, the disparity between manmade and natural threats that this and 
the following hypothetical together exemplify does not depend upon the defendant's being 
charged with a homicidal offense. These examples were introduced in SANFORD H. KADISH & 
MONROE G. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 570-71 (3d ed. 1975). I have 
discussed them in Berman, supra note 51, at 63-64. 
163. See, e.g., supra note 77 (quoting MPC ? 2.09(1)). 
164. See Westen & Mangiafico, supra note 160 (manuscript at 102-03). 
165. See id. (manuscript at 130) ("Conservatives wish to confine the defense to an actor's 
response to unlawful manmade threats.... Liberals in turn wish to expand the defense.., to 
natural threats that persons of reasonable firmness would be unable to resist."). 
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appropriate standard is a moralized or "contextualized" one that is 
capable of ranking the same evils differently, depending upon the 
relationships among the parties and the causal nature of resulting 
harms.166 
Because evils are contextualized in this way, Westen and 
Mangiafico contend, when the law affords the driver a valid duress 
defense in the gunman case, it is because the driver has in fact chosen 
the lesser of two evils.167 And if so, then duress is a justification, not an 
excuse.'68 At the same time, contextualization also means that the law 
is not committed to agreeing that the driver chose the lesser evil, 
hence should be entitled to a defense, in the road hazard case.169 
The first thing to notice about this argument is that the 
contextualization hypothesis does not itself defeat the view that there 
exists some subset of the duress defense that is an excuse. Suppose, as 
the contextualization hypothesis would hold, that the scope of the 
(justificatory) necessity defense is broader in cases of responses to 
manmade threats than in response to natural threats. At some point, 
however, a defendant will commit a criminal wrong in response to a 
manmade threat that the law deems not sufficient to make his 
conduct the choice of a lesser evil, but in which the pressure was 
substantial. The duress-as-an-excuse crowd will say that there exists a 
non-null set of cases within this space in which a defense should be 
granted. It is this set of cases that we mean by duress. When 
characterizing duress as an excuse, that is to say, we have in mind that 
extension of the defense which does not also qualify as choosing the 
lesser evil. 
To this, Westen and Mangiafico have two responses. The first 
returns us to the "central challenge"'70 of justifying the disparate 
treatment in duress law for manmade and natural threats. According 
to Westen and Mangiafico, (1) defenders of the excuse 
characterization of duress cannot justify this disparity, and (2) the 
disparity is appropriate.'71 But each of these claims is vulnerable. 
With respect, it's not clear from the Westen and Mangiafico 
article what supports proposition (2) beyond the authors' own 
166. Id. (manuscript at 103). 
167. Id. (manuscript at 102-03). 
168. Id. (manuscript at 103). 
169. Id. (manuscript at 103-04). 
170. Id. (manuscript at 101). 
171. Id. (manuscript at 103-04). 
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intuitions, supported by faith in the immanent logic of the common 
law. Furthermore, even if the law has gotten things right, those who 
characterize duress as an excuse can rely on fairly common second- 
order considerations to both explain and justify the existing disparity. 
The argument, in a small nutshell, is that notwithstanding first-order 
"liberal" sorts of reasons to codify a defense of situational duress that 
would cover some set of cases in which the defendant did not choose 
the lesser evil, systemic worries about the potential for abuse of the 
defense, false negatives, judicial efficiency, and the like, militate 
against it. For example, a defense of situational duress might threaten 
to allow every poor defendant charged with a property offense to 
reach a jury on his argument that life circumstances-of a force that 
reasonable people might find irresistible-"pressed" or "compelled" 
or "coerced" him into committing his criminal act. Surely the law 
might reasonably conclude that this would be intolerable 
notwithstanding the force of the "liberal" logic. 
This leads to Westen and Mangiafico's remaining argument. A 
defendant should be excused on grounds of duress, they observe, only 
if she has acted in some sense reasonably.72 Moreover, this standard 
of reasonableness must be somehow moralized, not purely 
statistical.'73 But if a defendant has acted in a morally reasonable way 
in acceding to a given threat, they conclude, then her conduct must be 
considered legally justified, not merely excused. "[A]n action that 
exhibits the 'courage and commitment that the law can properly 
demand of us' is not excused action. It is action that the law regards 
as tolerable, and hence action that is ultimately justified."174 
This, it seems to me, is the only argument Westen and 
Mangiafico marshal that directly challenges the excuse 
characterization of duress.175 Yet I think it does not succeed. Certainly 
it is logically possible for the law sometimes to tell its addressees that 
they must act with more than a morally adequate degree of firmness. 
172. See, e.g., MPC ? 2.09(1), quoted supra note 77. 
173. See Westen & Mangiafico, supra note 160 (manuscript at 175-76) ("The term 
'reasonable firmness'.... holds actors to the firmness-the steadfastness to avoid 
wrongdoing--that the law believes they ought to possess under the circumstances."). 
174. Id. (manuscript at 216) (quoting R.A. Duff, Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability: Do We 
Want an Aristotelian Criminal Law?, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 177 (2002)). 
175. The conceptualization thesis, recall, need entail only that the justificatory necessity 
defense should be broader in cases of manmade threats than in cases of natural threats. And the 
law's refusal to extend any defense to situational duress not amounting to the choice of a lesser 
evil can be explained and justified on second-order concerns that are reconcilable with the 
concession-to-human-frailty view of duress that would render it an excuse. 
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That is, the law could conceive of its own substantive, action-directing 
norms as sometimes demanding something closer to moral heroism. 
In this event, somebody who commits a prima facie criminal offense 
only because she has given in to substantial pressures (say, in the 
form of a do-it-or-else command issued by another) has violated the 
criminal law even all-things-considered, hence is not legally justified. 
And yet, if the law chooses not to punish people it deems not morally 
blameworthy, then the fact (if true) that our offender has exhibited 
morally reasonable firmness might sensibly translate into a conclusion 
that she is not morally blameworthy, hence legally excused. To the 
extent that legal excuse piggybacks upon or incorporates moral 
excuse, then the defendant's being not morally blameworthy ipso 
facto renders her legally excused, even though the law's decision to 
demand (in the substance of its forward-looking norms) more than 
mere non-blameworthiness denies her legal justification. 
In short, so long as the forward-looking norms of the criminal 
law can be more demanding than are the backward-looking moral 
norms of proper blame ascription, there appears no reason to deny 
that the criminal law can recognize a subset of duress that is not also 
the choice of a lesser evil or that any such defense counts as an excuse 
for purposes of legal taxonomy. The conventional wisdom that duress 
is an excuse therefore withstands the Westen and Mangiafico 
challenge. 
Proper classification of the provocation "defense"-i.e., the rule 
of law that intentional homicides committed under certain sorts of 
"heat of passion" qualify as voluntary manslaughter instead of, as 
they would be but for the provocation, murder-is much more 
controversial. According to the majority view, provocation is a partial 
excuse-an "indulgence," as one influential nineteenth-century 
decision put it, "to the frailty of human nature."176 A minority view 
characterizes it as a justification. As Andrew Ashworth explains, 
[t]his is not to argue that it is ever morally right to kill a person who 
does wrong. Rather, the claim implicit in partial justification is that 
an individual is to some extent morally justified in making a punitive 
return against someone who intentionally causes him serious 
offence, and that this serves to differentiate someone who is 
176. Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 219 (1862). The secondary literature defending this 
vision is large. For the most recent contribution by one of the leading defenders of the partial- 
excuse view, see Joshua Dressier, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a 
Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959 (2002). 
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provoked to lose his self-control and kill from the unprovoked 
killer.... The complicity of the victim cannot and should not be 
ignored, for the blameworthiness ofhis conduct has a strong bearing 
on the court's judgment of the seriousness of the provocation and 
the reasonableness of the accused's failure to control himself.'77 
If the above account of duress is correct, however, the very same 
sorts of reasons would seem to render provocation an excuse too. 
Most plausibly understood, I suggest, mitigation for provoked 
homicides is not part of the substantive, forward-looking normativity 
of the criminal law, but rather is a backward-looking inquiry into the 
just extent of the given defendant's punishability. It amounts, as 
Herbert Wechsler explained in defense of the Model Penal Code's 
expansion of common law provocation principles,178 "to a plea in 
mitigation based upon a mental or emotional trauma of significant 
dimensions, with the jury asked to show whatever empathy it can."179 
The criminal law should not be understood as advising one poised to 
kill in a heat of passion that doing so might be partially excused or 
partially justified, or that it could bring forth a reduced sentence 
relative to some sort of empirical or intuited baselines. Rather, the 
criminal law's prohibitory norm, I should think, seeks to realize itself 
in unequivocal terms: "Do not kill this person, no matter how 
inflamed your passions may be, and no matter how justifiably you 
may be aggrieved." 
If and when that norm is violated, however, it then turns to the 
state to determine how much punishment is due. And at that stage the 
law may conclude that the circumstances surrounding the defendant's 
conduct render her deserving of less punishment than would be the 
situation otherwise. Is this merely because she had "lost control"? I 
don't think so. As Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum persuasively 
argue, the emotions that caused the defendant to experience a much- 
diminished capacity for rational self-control are themselves proper 
subjects of moral evaluation.'" It is a necessary condition for 
mitigation to be deemed appropriate that the defendant had lost 
177. A.J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 292, 307-08 (1976) 
(footnote omitted). 
178. See MODEL PENAL CODE ? 210.3(1)(b) (1962) (providing that "a homicide which 
would otherwise be murder" is manslaughter if "committed under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse"). 
179. Herbert Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal 
Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1446 (1968). 
180. This is the central thesis of Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 12. 
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some capacity to control her thoughts and actions. But it is not 
sufficient. If the ultimate measure of an actor's blameworthiness is the 
degree to which she fails to manifest appropriate regard for right 
values and interests, then to lose control because, say, one hates gay 
people can, and should, be assessed differently than to lose control 
because one is angry at an injury done to one's child.'8 
Aha!, defenders of the partial-justification conception of 
provocation might retort, isn't this simply to say "that an individual is 
to some extent morally justified in making a punitive return against 
someone who intentionally causes him serious offense"?'82 Perhaps. 
But that is not to the point. The question is not (as Ashworth's 
argument seems to imply) whether the intentional killer with a 
paradigmatic provocation claim is not only less morally blameworthy 
than would be the case but for the provocation, but also has acted less 
morally wrongfully. The question-or what is generally taken to be 
the question-is whether the provocation claim is better classified for 
purposes of the internal taxonomy of the criminal law as a partial 
excuse or as a partial justification. 
And if my account of legal justification is correct, then to classify 
provocation as a partial (legal) justification is not only to believe that 
defendants who have a valid provocation defense are partially 
morally justified (a matter with respect to which I'm agnostic), but 
also to assume that statutory punishments for serious crimes like 
intentional homicides are part of the regime's conduct rules. Put 
another way, it is to assume that the criminal punishment to be 
administered for voluntary manslaughter is a price, not a sanction.13 
But even if some criminal penalties are properly conceived of as 
prices, that the penalties available for intentional homicides would be 
among them is exceedingly implausible. If this is right, then the 
reduction in penalty that a valid provocation claim buys exists as part 
181. Id. at 312-15 & nn.183-84 (contrasting Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362, 1364 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) with People v. Shields, 575 N.E.2d 538, 546 (I11. 1991)). Kahan and 
Nussbaum proceed to contend that provocation is neither justification nor excuse. Id. at 318-19. 
Provocations cannot be partial justifications, they believe, because "[j]ustifications are said to 
identify acts that produce morally preferred states of affairs." Id. And they can't be partial 
excuses because excuses "are concerned with how the defendant's particular circumstances 
affected her capacity or opportunity to obey the law." Id. at 319. Of course, I believe that here 
the authors go awry by assuming too uncritically what I have argued are incorrect conceptions 
of these legal categories. 
182. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
183. For the classic comparison between price and sanction see Robert Cooter, Prices and 
Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984). 
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of the criminal law's backward-looking rules of responsibility, not as 
part of its forward-looking, conduct-guiding norms. Legally speaking, 
therefore, it is a partial excuse, not a partial justification, 
notwithstanding that a defendant might be deemed entitledto this 
excuse in part because her conduct was partially justified, morally 
speaking.l84 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued here that the distinction, for purposes of the 
criminal law, between justification and excuse has no necessary 
substantive relationship to moral wrongfulness.'85 Instead, the roles 
that justifications and excuses play in the criminal law are only 
structurally equivalent to the roles they play in moral reasoning: 
justification defenses qualify the offenses to provide that certain 
conduct is not criminal, all things considered; excuse defenses specify 
the circumstances under which an offender cannot be punished for 
having violated the criminal law. This might seem a weak claim, 
entailing nothing in particular about the concrete disputes that have 
so vigorously engaged scholars for the past twenty-five years. But that 
is always true of conceptual, or analytical, studies. As the philosopher 
C.L. Stevenson explained, "[t]he purpose of an analytic or 
methodological study, whether of science or ethics [or law, we might 
add], is... to send others to their tasks with clearer heads and less 
wasteful habits of investigation."'86 Moreover, to say that a proper 
understanding of justification and excuse entails no particular 
conclusions to a variety of substantive disputes is, in fact, to say 
184. See also Dressier, supra note 176, at 962 ("It is a partial excuse based on the actor's 
partial loss of self-control, although (and here is where confusion lies) the reason for the actor's 
loss of self-control sometimes (but not always) has a justificatory-type component."). 
185. A final caveat: Justifications and excuses within the criminal law may have a necessary 
substantive relationship to their counterparts in ordinary morality if all of law has a necessary 
substantive relationship to morality. Whether that is so, and if so, what the nature of that 
relationship is, are the central questions of the main branch of contemporary jurisprudence and 
cannot be explored with any seriousness here. But let me caution against a too complacent 
assumption that the theoretical claims within any particular field of law are ultimately hostage 
to the (yet more abstract) theoretical claims about law, full stop. The relationship, rather, is one 
of mutual interdependence. Thus, were it to turn out that the thesis presented here is 
compatible (in part or in toto) only with a particular variety of positivism, then just as 
arguments against that variety of positivism would count against the instant thesis (or some part 
thereof), so too would arguments in support of the present thesis count against the competing 
theories of law. 
186. C.L. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE 1 (1944). 
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something of importance. What follows is a radical skepticism of all 
arguments that purport to derive any necessary shape for the positive 
criminal law from the justification/excuse distinction itself. By 
showing just how thin is the conceptual distinction between the 
defenses of justification and excuse (even if the contents of the two 
categories are driven by considerations that are substantive to the 
criminal law, not just formal), I hope to prod scholars to argue for 
their favored articulations of particular defenses (like particular 
offenses) in terms of good policy broadly conceived-justice, fairness, 
efficiency, administrability, and the like-not in terms of conceptual 
or logical truths. 
When embarking upon these tasks, to be sure, theorists and law 
reformers may find it extremely useful to think hard about what 
makes conduct morally justifiable and about when conduct that is not 
morally justifiable is nonetheless morally excusable. This is because 
no minimally just regime of criminal law can treat these judgments 
with indifference. It is a different matter entirely to try to separate the 
"legally justifiable" from the "legally excusable." The case for the 
wisdom in that still has not been made. 
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